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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case and Parties

This marks the fifth appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court in seven different cases filed by
Reed and Donna Taylor (herein referred to as "Reed" and "Donna") 1 in an attempt to redeem
their shares in AIA Services Corporation ("AIA"). 2 Additionally, two cases have been filed in
federal court regarding this issue, one case is pending in Washington's state court, and Donna
made an unsuccessful attempt to intervene in a California proceeding. The current matter is an
interlocutory appeal in relation to two lawsuits filed by Donna, both of which seek redemption
payments for the Series A Preferred shares in AIA she received as de facto alimony at the time of
her divorce from Reed in 1987.
Donna's initial Complaint (in which Reed was not named as a defendant) against John
Taylor ("John") (CV 08-01150) sought to enforce a letter signed by Reed and John in which
Donna agreed to defer five of her monthly redemption payments in return for Reed and John's
personal guarantee of those five payments. Repeated amendments to that Complaint named
Connie Taylor Henderson ("Connie") as a defendant while alleging additional claims of breach
of fiduciary duty, false representations, fraud, constructive fraud, constructive trust, and unjust
enrichment. In response, John, and Connie asserted a number of affirmative defenses and

1

Some parties' first names will be used in an effort to avoid confusion as multiple parties have the last name of
"Taylor" or a variation thereof.
2 Taylor v. McNichols and Taylor v. Babbitt (consolidated), 149 Idaho 826,243. P.3d 642 (2010); Taylor v. A/A
Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829 (2011), Taylor v. Riley and Taylor v. Eberle Berlin (consolidated), 157
Idaho 323, 336 P.3d 256 (2014) and Taylor v. Riley 11,just decided at S. Ct. Docket No. 43686-2015.
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counterclaimed for unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and abuse of process. 3 Donna filed
another suit naming three new defendants: James Beck, ("Beck"), Michael Cashman
("Cashman"/ and AIA while keeping the same claims as listed above.
Ultimately, the overarching issue in this appeal is whether the interest rate on AIA's
redemption of Donna's remaining Series A preferred shares is prime less 1 Yz% or whether it is
prime plus V-i%. It is the respondents' and cross-appellants' position that District Court correctly
ruled that the applicable interest rate is prime less 1. Yz %. As a result, Donna has 7,110 of
remaining shares in AIA eligible for redemption, in the event AIA has the funds to redeem those
shares without violating Idaho law.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

AIA was founded in 1983 by Reed and Donna. (R. 475.) However, their relationship
deteriorated and in 1987 Donna and Reed entered into a Property Settlement Agreement as a part
of their divorce settlement. (R. 532-600.) In that agreement Donna and Reed contributed their
ownership interests in AIA in exchange for 200,000 shares of Series A Preferred Stock and 5,963
shares of common stock, respectively. This effectively diverted funds from AIA to pay Reed's
alimony. (R. 532-600.) Pursuant to that agreement, AIA's Articles of Incorporation ("1987
Articles") were amended by AIA shareholders to include the redemption of Donna's shares at an
interest rate of prime less 1 Yz %. (R. 2446, Article 4.5.) Additionally, the 1987 Articles state

Donna's Third Amended Complaint in CV 08-01150 has not been litigated because it was filed shortly before the
trial court granted AIA's motion for summary judgment that led to this appeal.
4 John, Connie, James Beck, and Michael Cashman, when referred to together will herein be referred to as
"defendants'' while James Beck and Michael Cashman individually will be herein referred to as "Beck" and
"Cashman" respectively.
3
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that the redemption of Donna's shares could only be made " ... from legally available funds ...
but only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporations Act
restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares." (R. 2445, Article 4.3(a).)
Furthermore, the 1987 Articles state that AIA may elect to redeem shares via installment
payments in lieu of a lump sum. (R. 2446, Article 4.6(b).) During this time Reed was the
majority shareholder, CEO, and Chairman of the Board of AIA. (R. 30.) In 1989 AIA's Articles
were amended again and added Article 12 which allowed AIA to purchase its own shares to the
extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus. (R. 680-81.)
In December 1992, Donna informed AIA that she wished to redeem her shares in the
corporation. (R. 14, paragraph 14.) Both parties entered into an agreement to redeem Donna's
shares at $10.00 per share over a period of 15 years at an interest rate of prime less 11/z %. (R. 14,
paragraph 14.) Subsequently, AIA began redeeming Donna's shares per that agreement. (R.
808.) However, after entering into that agreement, AIA suffered enormous losses with Reed at
the helm; according to CPA Paul Pederson, a total of $15,993,795 was written off in 1994 and
1995 due to losses associated with the Universe Life Insurance Company 5 (R. 2030) coupled
with Reed's general mismanagement of AIA, extravagant personal spending, and his diversion of
AIA funds to pay his alimony. (R. 3545.) By 1995, AIA had an earned deficit of $(18,760,127), a
total stockholder's deficit of $(17,018,838), an operating loss of $(84,479), and negative net
income of $(10,650,150). (R. 2030.) This led to AIA's default on its redemption agreement with
Donna.

5

The Universal Life Insurance Company was, at the time, a direct subsidiary of AJA.

3
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Reed's terrible mismanagement of AIA left its future as a profitable entity anything but
certain and AIA was left in financial ruin. (R. 2030; 3509-53.) During this tumultuous time, AIA
sought to reorganize through a multi-faceted Reorganization Plan which included terms
negotiated via letters between Donna's counsel and AIA to accelerate the redemption of her
shares at a higher interest rate of prime plus

ll,i

% (herein called the "1995 Letters.") (R. 3509-53;

1259; 3481; 438-440; - 440-46; - 448-449 - ) These letters discussed revising the amortization
schedule and increasing the interest rate of AIA'S redemption of Donna's shares in AIA to prime
plus

ll,i

%. (R. 438; 442; 448.)6 At a special shareholder's meeting held on March 7, 1995, the

change in Donna's redemption terms as a part of AIA's Reorganization Plan was presented. (R.
3485 - 3505.) That plan was adopted; however the resolutions and agreement contained therein
were contingent on upon the closing of a Private Placement of Series B Preferred Stock, Series C
Preferred Stock, and Warrants in AIA. (R. 3512-14.) It was also during this time that R. John
Taylor ("John"), James Beck ("Beck"), and Michael Cashman ("Cashman"), became majority
shareholders in AIA.

Reed stepped aside as CEO (although he remained on the Board of

Directors as a Director of AIA through 2001). (R. 1957, 2225-38, 970-976.) As a result of the
meeting on March 7, 1995, AIA shareholders adopted Articles of Amendment and although a
change to Donna's redemption terms was discussed, those articles maintained the prime less 1Yz
% interest rate for Donna's redemption. (R. 688.) Ultimately, the Reorganization Plan was not
consummated because AIA Services failed to raise the necessary funds through private
placement. Taylor v. AJA Servs. Corp., 151 Idaho 552,557,261 P.3d 829 (2011).
These letters were correspondence between Donna's divorce attorney, Cumer Green, a CPA (R. 3524) and member
ofthe AJA Board of Directors in 1994 and 1995 and AIA. (R. 975, 976.)
6
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In July 1996, Donna entered into a Preferred Shareholders Agreement ("PSA") with Reed
and AIA. (R. 451-59.) Concurrently, AIA, Reed, and Donna entered into a Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement ("SRA.") (R. 149.). The PSA increased Donna's interest rate on AIA's
redemption of her shares to prime plus ll,i%, and provided that Reed's right to payment on the
sums owed to him under the SRA was subordinated to Donna's redemption of her Series A
shares. (R. 454). 7 The PSA, which was signed by Donna, Reed, and AIA, also stated, "No
provision of this agreement may be amended, modified, waived, or supplemented, except by a
writing signed by all parties to this agreement." (R. 458.) Under these agreements, AIA paid
Donna $2,696,797.80 and Reed $9,709,367 in cash, along with equity in AIA assets and debt
forgiveness. (R. 2376; 3348-50.) Subsequently, Reed's SRA was deemed illegal and
unenforceable based on then controlling Idaho Code § 30-1-6. Taylor at 574-5. Futher, the
parties in this case have agreed that Donna's 1996 PSA is illegal and unenforceable for the same
reasons discussed in the Taylor case.
In an effort to keep itself afloat, AIA elected to move in a different direction and as a
result formed Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA"). (R. 627.) In order to obtain the
necessary funding to do this, AIA and Reed sought Donna's approval to defer five (5) of its
redemption payments to her. (R. 627.) However, by 2006, redemption payments to Reed and
Donna from AIA had exhausted the company. (R. 2376.) In response, Reed and Donna
clandestinely entered into an agreement to reverse the subordination clauses contained in the
PSA and SRA, giving Reed redemption priority over Donna. (R. 461.) Neither Reed nor Donna
7

The Letter Agreements which Donna seeks to enforce also provided for Reed's debt to be subordinated to the
redemption of her Series A Shares. (R. 602.)

5
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informed AIA of this arrangement and AIA paid Donna $175,000 to which she was not entitled,
based on Reed and Donna's hidden agreement. (R. 2376; 2794.) By 2008 AIA could no longer
sustain itself while paying Donna and Reed. (R. 2376.)
In order to keep AIA a going concern, it stopped making payments to Reed and Donna.
Taylor at 558; (R. 633.) As a result, Reed brought suit against AIA. See Generally, Taylor v. AJA
Servs. Corp. 151 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011). Ultimately, it was found that Reed's 1996

SRA was in violation of Idaho state law and thus, was invalid and unenforceable. Taylor at 57475. In response, AIA continued to forestall making redemption payments to Donna because
further payments under an illegal agreement would open up AIA to legal action from minority
shareholders.
Essentially, the initial terms for the redemption of Donna's shares are contained in AIA's
1987 Articles; prime less 1 Yi%. Additionally, under both the law and the express terms of the
1987 Articles, Donna is entitled to redemption of her remaining 7,110 shares only from "legally
available funds" to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporations
Act restrictions on the AIA' s redemption of its own shares.

III.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

June 2, 2008, Donna filed her first Complaint against John for the redemption of her
shares in AIA and other claims. (R. 136-39.) That complaint was amended and filed to include
Connie Taylor Henderson as a defendant. (R. 159-66.) In response, John and Connie filed a
counterclaim, however, a ruling in that case was stayed due to this Court's then pending decision
in Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., et al., 151 Idaho 552, 261 P .3d 829 (2011) (R. 167-77.)

6
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At issue in Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., et al. was whether the District Court erred when
it dismissed six of Reed's causes of action based on Idaho Code § 30-1-6 (1995). Taylor at 556.
This Court ruled that the SRA entered into by Reed and AIA in 1996 was illegal and
unenforceable pursuant to LC. § 30-1-6, as that code required AIA to use earned surplus and not
capital surplus when redeeming Reed's shares in the company. Id. Based on that decision, all
parties agreed that the 1996 PSA entered into by Donna and AIA was also illegal. (R. 1058-59.)
Accordingly, John and Connie moved for partial summary judgment claiming Donna's stock
redemption was illegal and unenforceable. (R. 405-16.) In response, Donna argued that AIA
could use its capital surplus to redeem her shares based on the Letter Agreements exchanged
between the parties in 1995 and not the 1996 PSA. (R. 503-24.) Ultimately, John and Connie's
motion was denied and the stay was lifted. (R. 1009-14.)
On May 24, 2013, Donna filed a second suit against John, Connie, AIA, James Beck, and
Cashman for, among other things, breach of fiduciary duties, and unjust enrichment. (R. 11-25.)
In response, AIA filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting Donna breached the 1996 SRA by
entering into a subordination agreement with Reed, unbeknownst to AIA. (R. 54-63.) In the
interest of efficacy, the District Court consolidated both suits. (R. 64-73.) On March 17, 2014,
AIA filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. (R. 1032-89; 1190-1213 .) In response,
Donna filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing that the 1995 Letter Agreements
were legal and AIA had authorization to use capital surplus at that time to redeem her remaining
shares. (R. 2049-2308.)

7
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On July 14, 2014, the District Court granted both motions in part, ruling: Donna's claims
of fraud and fiduciary duty were barred by the Economic Loss Rule; she failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted for unjust enrichment; the 1996 SRA was illegal; the 1995
Letter Agreements were valid and enforceable and that Donna owned 41,509.69 shares in AIA.
(R. 2413-30.) Subsequently, both parties filed motions for reconsideration and the court later

ruled that Donna's breach of fiduciary duty claims were not barred by the Economic Loss Rule.
(R. 2601-10.) In response, AIA filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the number of
shares held by Donna was 7,110 and on June 15, 2015, the court ruled in AIA's favor. (R. 334651.)
In support of that motion, John and Connie supplied the court with uncontroverted
evidence that AIA shareholders had not voted to amend the interest rate for redemption of
Donna's shares contained in AIA's 1987 Articles. (R. 3346-3351.) Based on that evidence, and
this Court's ruling in the Taylor case, the court ruled that the 1995 Letter Agreements were
unenforceable and as a result, the applicable interest rate regarding the redemption of Donna's
shares in AIA was prime less 1 Yz % as stated in the 1987 Articles. (R. 3346-51.) Additionally,
based on that ruling, AIA had successfully redeemed all but 7,110 of Donna's shares when the
redemption payments to Donna were reamortized at the lower rate. (R. 3350.) Further, that court
issued a judgment dismissing, with prejudice, the following claims made by Donna: breach of
contract; fraud; aiding and abetting fraud; and unjust enrichment. (R. 3346-51.)
On July 21, 2015, Donna filed a third amended complaint in her first suit. (R. 3367-77.)
In response, John and Connie answered that third amended complaint and counterclaimed with

8
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claims of abuse of process and unjust enrichment. (R. 3378-88.) On September 8, 2016, the
District court issued a Rule 54(b) judgment based on its prior rulings and Donna moved to
amend that judgment. (R. 3442-64.) That motion was denied on December 28, 2016. (R. 3806.)
In response, Donna appealed and John, Connie, Beck, and Cashman cross-appealed. (R. 3805-

59.)

IV.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL

1. Did the District Court err in ruling Donna's claims of breach of

fiduciary duty against the Defendants are not barred by the economic
loss rule?
2. Did the District Court err in ruling Donna's reverse subordination
agreement was not a breach of contract?
3. Are the respondents entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees
on appeal?
V.

ARGUMENT

This Cross-Appeal and reply arises from the District Court's decisions on motions for
summary judgment and motions for reconsideration. (R. 2413-30; 2601-10; 3346-51; 3802-04.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the District Court's rulings on motions for summary judgment this Court
uses the same standard of review as the District Court. Frangella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,
271 (2012). Although evidence is looked upon in favor of the non-moving party, if all available
evidence in the record shows there is no issue of genuine material fact, then the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Additionally, when considering a motion for
reconsideration which follows a motion for summary judgment, this Court " ... must determine

9
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whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment." Id
at 276. Thus, the summary judgment standard is used by this Court in reviewing a District
Court's decision on summary judgment and motion for reconsideration. Id. Meaning, this Court
reviews a denial of a motion for reconsideration de novo. Shea v. Kevic Corp., l 56 Idaho 540,
545 (2014).
1. The court should dismiss all claims/arguments that go beyond the scope of the District
Court's IRCP 54(b) Judgment, are not supported by the record, are unsupported by
cogent argument and authority, or seek advisory opinions.

The majority of Donna's appellate brief is comprised of unproven allegations relevant
only to her claims of breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, or
her request that this Court impose the alter ego doctrine. However, none of these claims are a
part of the IRCP 54(b) Judgment and may not be considered on appeal. Taylor, 151 Idaho at 558.
These allegations have never been adjudicated and have been consistently denied. Through her
appeal, Donna seeks appellate review without ever having proven her claims through admissible
evidence (as opposed to declarations of her counsel).
The Defendants also ask that this Court disregard the many arguments throughout
Donna's brief that acknowledge she is going beyond the record and in which the error
complained of is not identified or the issue is not supported by cogent argument and authority.
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6). To the extent AIA and the individuals are able, issues raised by
Donna which rely on evidence outside of the record or are unsupported by cogent argument, are
addressed throughout this cross-appeal and reply.
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A. Donna's demand for a new judge on remand is improper.

Donna's demand that this Court assign a new District Court judge on remand is improper.
The case cited, Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 283 P.3d 728 (2012),
is one in which the appellate court reviewed the propriety of a judge's denial of a Motion to
Disqualify for Cause. In this case, there is no such issue and Donna's argument is simply a
request for a purely advisory opinion, which the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized it is not
empowered to issue. Taylor, 151 Idaho at 569, citing MDS Invs., L.L.C. v. State, 138 Idaho 456,
464-65, 65 P.3d 197, 205-06 (2003).
2. The District Court was correct in ruling that Donna currently owns 7,110 shares in AIA
based on prior redemption payments made by AIA and the 1987 Articles.
A. The District Court correctly ruled that the Preferred Shareholders
Agreement entered into by AIA, Reed, and Donna is illegal an
unenforceable.

Contracts are interpreted based on their plain and ordinary meaning. Knipe Land Co. v.

Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 259 (2011). " ... corporate documents are equivalent to contracts ... the
normal rules governing the interpretation of contracts apply." Twin Lakes Vil!. Prop. Ass 'n v.

Aune, 124 Idaho 132 (1993 ). As such, "the determination of a contract's meaning and legal effect
is a question of law when the contract is clear and unambiguous." Id. Additionally, an illegal and
unenforceable contract is one in which the consideration provided violates a statute, law, or is
contrary to public policy. Taylor, 151 Idaho at 564-65. Further, "where a statute intends to
prohibit an act, it must be held that its violation is illegal, without regard to the reason of the
inhibition or to the ignorance of the parties as to the prohibiting statue." Id.
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In this case there is no question that the 1996 PSA entered into by AIA and Donna
violated then existing Idaho Code § 30-1-6. Idaho Code § 30-1-6, now repealed, states that a
corporation has the right to redeem its own shares in one of two ways: through the use of
unrestricted earned available surplus if the articles of incorporation permit the use of that surplus

or through the use of unrestricted capital surplus, but only if voted on and approved by the
shareholders. LC. § 30-1-6 (1995). When AIA, Reed, and Donna entered into the PSA in July
1996, AIA had no earned surplus and was not authorized to use capital surplus because its
shareholders never explicitly voted in favor of its use to redeem either Reed or Donna's shares.

Taylor at 560-62. Therefore, Donna's PSA is illegal and unenforceable, just as Reed's SRA was.
B. The District Court was not required to determine whether the PSA was
enforceable under any exception to the illegality doctrine.

Donna argues, albeit incorrectly, that the District Court was required to determine
whether the PSA should have been enforced via an exception to the afore-mentioned illegality
doctrine. However, the District Court was not required to do so. It is true that a court has a duty
to raise the issue of illegality of a contract sua sponte. Tress v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d
765, 768 (2002) There are three exceptions in which a court may grant relief to an innocent party
based on the illegality of a contract: one, when public policy requires; two, if the parties are not

in pari delicto or when fraud, undue influence or duress is present; and three, some relief is
granted to insured who signed void insurance contracts, if unenforceable, would defeat the
purpose of the statute. Taylor, 151 Idaho at 565; Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist.# 401,
147 Idaho 277,287,207 P.3d 1008, 1018 (2009). However, "Courts on occasion, however, apply
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an exception to the illegality doctrine ... " Trees at 9.
When the court finds a contract to be illegal, it must leave the parties where the law finds
them. Id. As such, the District Court, when ruling that Donna's

PSA was illegal and

unenforceable, was not required to determine whether the PSA was enforceable under any of the
above-mentioned exceptions, (R. 3346-50.) Donna argues, for the first time in her brief, that the
PSA was enforceable under the in pari delicto exception, and under the public policy exception;
both of which are addressed in turn.

C. The PSA is not enforceable under the in pari delicto exception to the
illegality doctrine.
A court may enforce an illegal contract when the parties are not in equal fault. Wernecke
at 287. Donna seems to argue, disjointedly and convolutedly, that because she was not
represented by counsel when she entered into the PSA, she is an innocent party. However, the
Donna was represented by counsel, attorney Cumer Green, when entering into the 1995 letter
agreements. (R. 602-625.) Further, Donna was advised to consult legal counsel prior to signing
the PSA, which was a mere formality, based on the 1995 Letter Agreements, and voluntarily
elected not to do so. (R. 622.) Thus, Donna's choice to not be represented by counsel when
entering into the PSA is not a reason to enforce an illegal contract as her choice to be uninformed
is insufficient to make her an innocent party to the PSA. See generally Taylor at 566. Donna also
argues that because she lacks a secondary or formal education, this somehow grants her special
status in regards to the enforcement of the illegal PSA. However, in rejecting this argument,this
Court found "where a statute intends to prohibit an act, it must be held that its violation is illegal,
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without regard to the reason of the inhibition or to the ignorance of the parties as to the
prohibiting statute." Taylor at 565. As such, Donna's ignorance of the law is irrelevant.
Therefore, Donna's voluntary choice to not be represented by counsel when entering into the
PSA and her ignorance of I.C. § 30-1-6 does not make her an innocent party to the agreement.
Donna further argues that because John and Connie are, and were at the time AIA entered into
the PSA, licensed attorneys they are presumed to have known that the PSA was illegal and as
such are not innocent parties. However, John and Connie were not parties to the PSA, and did
not represent AIA as agents or as counsel in their capacity as licensed attorneys when AIA and
Donna entered into the PSA. (R. 623; 3476; 3485; 3524; 3554.) Thus, their status as attorneys is
completely irrelevant.
D. The PSA is not enforceable under the public policy exception to the
illegality doctrine.

Donna argues that in the event this Court does not agree that the PSA is enforceable,
it should create a remedy for her under quantum meruit based on this Court's ruling in Farrell v.

Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 611, 200 P.3d 1153, 1160 (2008). " ... quantum meruit permits
recovery, based on an implied promise to pay, of the reasonable value of the services rendered or
the material provided." Great Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 767,
979 P.2d 627 (1999). In Farrell case, an architect was impliedly contracted and performed
services under that contract both before and after being licensed as an architect in Idaho. Farrell
at 608. As a result, this Court ruled that the District Court was correct in awarding the architect
damages based on quantum meruit for services rendered after becoming licensed. However, this
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case is unlike the Farrell case as Donna provided no services to AIA or the individual
defendants. In fact, it was AIA who provided a benefit to Donna vis a vis Reed when AIA was
essentially forced to make payments to her after both Reed and Donna entered into the Property
Settlement Agreement that served as Reed's alimony settlement in their divorce. (R.946; 991;
2256-57.) Thus, Donna has contributed no services to AIA or the individual defendants. In fact,
she has been paid by AIA to the tune of over $2 million dollars. Therefore, any remedy based on
quantum meruit is inapplicable.
E. Donna's arguments and claims of breach of fiduciary duties should
not be considered by this Court as they are claims outside the scope of
this appeal.

Additionally, Donna claims that John, Beck, and Cashman breached their fiduciary duties
when they didn't hold a special shareholder meeting to specifically authorize the use of capital
surplus to redeem her shares in AIA. However, it is important to note that Donna's claims of
AIA directors' and officers' breach of fiduciary duties are not at issue in this appeal and should
not be considered as these issues are beyond the scope of the Rule 54(b) certified judgment.
Taylor at 558; (R. 3439.). However, if in the event this Court does address these issues, there is

no merit to the argument that AIA officers and directors breached their fiduciary duties to
minority shareholders, including Donna. All parties to the PSA were under the impression that
the PSA was legal based on the opinion of outside counsel hired by AIA. (R. 623; 3476; 3485;
3524; 3554.) The use of in-house and outside counsel when entering into the PSA is indicative of
AIA directors' and officers' commitment to AIA and its shareholders.
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F. The District Court did not err when it did not sever illegal portions of the
PSA in regards to Reed as doing so would have no effect on portions
pertaining to Donna.

Donna argues that this Court should sever the portions of the PSArelating to Reed and
claims that this would then make the PSA valid and enforceable. In the event a transaction
contains " ... both benign and offensive components and the different components are severable,
the unobjectionable parts are generally enforceable." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 611,
200 P.3d 1153, 1160 (2008). Rules permitting the enforcement of those unobjectionable parts are
not invariably applicable. Nelson v. Armstrong, 99 Idaho 422, 426, 582 P.2d 1100, 1104 (1978).
However, even if those portions relating to Reed were severed, Donna's PSA still violates LC. §
30-1-6, making the provisions related to Donna illegal. During summary judgment, Donna,
through counsel, agreed that the PSA was illegal for the same reason Reed's SRA was illegal.
(R. 2425.); See Taylor, 151 Idaho at 567.
In the Taylor case, this Court determined that LC.§ 30-1-6 was intended to prohibit the
use of capital surplus by a corporation to redeem its shares unless authorized by the shareholders
and to do so without that authorization would favor one shareholder at the expense of other
shareholders and creditors. Id. Additionally, Donna acknowledges that the 1996 SRA entered
into by Reed and AIA tainted her 1996 PSA with AIA, making her agreement illegal and
unenforceable. (R. 2282.) Thus, even if this Court were to sever the portions of the PSA related
to Reed, it would have no effect on the portions related to Donna as they are still illegal.
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G. AIA, John, Connie, Beck, and Cashman may use I.C. § 30-1-6 as a
legal and equitable defense because contracts involving consideration
expressly prohibited by statute are void.
Alternatively, Donna argues that this Court may enforce the illegal PSA because AIA,
John, Beck, Cashman, and Connie were not intended beneficiaries of I.C. § 30-1-6 based on the
Colorado Supreme Court's ruling in Minnelusa Co. v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321 (Col.
1996). In that case, the defendant was a Florida corporation who became insolvent and as a
result, a creditor demanded personal loan guarantees from Minnelusa shareholders. Minnelusa at
1322. The shareholders refused to do so and the corporation entered into a stock repurchase
agreement to buy out their shares. Id. Minnelusa defaulted on the repurchase agreement and the
shareholders sued. Id. In response, Minnelusa argued that because it was insolvent, it could not
repurchase the remaining shares pursuant to a Florida statute which prohibits an insolvent
corporation from repurchasing its own stock. Id. The issue in that case was whether a corporation
such as Minnelusa was the intended beneficiary of the Florida statute and the court ruled that it
was not. Id. However, this Court has rejected the Minnelusa argument in the Taylor case. Taylor
at 564. "[A] court of equity ... does not concern itself as to the manner in which the illegality of a
matter before it is brought to its attention." Id. As a result, as this Court has already ruled that
AIA, John, Beck, Cashman, and Connie may assert I.C. § 30-1-6 as a defense and the ruling in
Minnelusa is inapplicable. Taylor, 151 Idaho at 564.

Further, Donna argues that AIA may not disavow its obligation to her based on the ruling
in La Voy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 369 P.2d 45, 49 (1952). In that case, a former
shareholder in a corporation sold his stock back to the corporation in return for a note and
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mortgage. La Vay Supply at 124. The corporation became insolvent and could not continue to
make payments on the note to the shareholder. Id. The LaVoy Court ruled that a corporation
itself cannot have a stock repurchase declared illegal. Id at 127. This Court specifically rejected
this argument in the Taylor case, ruling "a court of equity ... does not concern itself as to the
manner in which the illegality of a matter before it is brought to its attention." Taylor at 564.
Thus, AIA, John, Connie, Beck, and Cashman may assert LC. § 30-1-6 as a defense.
In both of the above-mentioned instances, the PSA should not be enforced. This Court
has long recognized that although" ... consequences of a court finding a contract to be illegal are
harsh, only those contracts which involve consideration that is expressly prohibited by the
relevant prohibitory statute are void." Farrell at 609. In this case, at the time the PSA was
entered into AIA had no earned surplus, it had no capital surplus, and there had not been
shareholder approval to use capital surplus to redeem Donna's shares. (R. 2376.) This is exactly
what is prohibited by the statute. Thus, the PSA is void and thus enforceable under LC. § 30-1-6.
See Taylor at 564.

Alternatively, Donna argues that shareholder approval was not needed to approve a
change in the interest rate from prime less 1 Yz% to prime plus \/,i%. However, Donna supports
this argument by stating she has found no authority that requires more than board approval of
the change in interest rate based on Idaho Code§ 30-1-35 (repealed). This argument fails to take
into consideration the fact the contract for AIA's redemption of Donna's shares is contained
solely in AIA's 1987 Articles. Under LC.§ 30-1-1003 (recodified in 1995 as LC.§ 30-29-1003),
once a corporation has issued shares, any amendment to the corporations Articles of
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Incorporation must first be adopted by the board of directors, and then (with minor exceptions
not applicable in the present case) the amendment must be submitted to the shareholders for their
approval. I.C. § 30-29-1003.
In addition, I.C. § 30-1-6 expressly states that in order for a corporation to redeem its
shares it must do so from earned surplus or capital surplus provided that the corporation's
shareholders have expressly authorized. I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995) (repealed). This clearly states the
requirements a corporation must adhere to in order to redeem its stock. Since the 1996 PSA is
illegal and unenforceable because AIA had no earned surplus, nor did AIA have capital surplus
and shareholder authorization to use that capital surplus, Donna and AIA are bound to the 1987
Articles.
H. The District Court did not err when it ruled that the recalculation and
reamortization was a correct accounting of Donna's shares in AIA to
date.

Donna argues that the District Court erred when it relied on AIA's recalculation and
reamortization of Donna's shares in AIA because she claims the figures contained therein are
based on speculation. However, these figures were calculated by computer programmer and
analyst Kenneth Goods, under oath, using TValue amortization software. (R. 1068.) Mr. Goods
based these figures on the payments made to Donna at the appropriate interest rate of prime less
1 Vi%. (R. 1068.) As of March 13, 2014, AIA had paid $2,776,458.25 to Donna and included the
appropriate interest in the amount $776,458.25. (R. 1072-97.) Donna agreed that the appropriate
interest rate to apply to AIA's redemption was an issue for the court to determine. (R. 3349.)
Now, Donna wishes to appeal this amount simply because she does not agree with it. These
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figures are not speculation and the court rightfully determined that the payments made to Donna
redeemed all but 7, 110 shares in AIA.

I. The District Court was correct in dismissing Donna's claim for breach
of contract as she has failed to establish the existence of earned
surplus or capital surplus, let alone AIA's solvency.
To present a prima facie case that AIA has breached its duty to redeem her shares, Donna
must prove that AIA could do so without violating the Idaho Business Corporations
Act. However, she failed to present sufficient evidence to establish her claim, and as a result, the
District Court correctly dismissed her breach of contract claim. (R. 3439.)
This Court has determined that AIA had no earned surplus in 1995. Taylor, 151 Idaho at
561. Additionally, Donna submitted no evidence to show that AIA had capital surplus at the time
of the Letter Agreements. She has also failed to establish that AIA was solvent at the time of the
Letter Agreements, which is a requirement for AIA to make a legal redemption of Donna's
shares. Taylor, 151 Idaho at 569. Further, "No purchase or payment for its own shares shall be
made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make
it insolvent." LC. § 30-1-6 (repealed).
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3. The District Court correctly left the parties where they were based on the 1987 Articles
because the 1995 Letter Agreements were superseded by the 1996 Preferred
Shareholder Agreement, which is illegal and unenforceable, and as a result so are the
1995 Letters.
A. There was no shareholder approval authorizing the increase in interest to
be paid to Donna on the redemption of her preferred shares in AIA.
Prior to its ruling on June 14, 2014, the District Court held that the 1995 Letters were
enforceable as they could not be superseded by an illegal agreement. (R. 2426.) However, the
District Court subsequently changed its ruling based on a motion to reconsider and new evidence
presented. (R. 3349.) Ultimately, the court ruled that because there was no evidence of a
shareholder vote authorizing the use of capital surplus or to increase the amount of interest paid
on Donna's redemption, as discussed in the 1995 Letters, the parties were to be left where they
stood in 1987 when AIA amended its Articles. (R. 3346-50.)
This decision was based on the declaration of AIA Secretary JoLee Duclos and the
reamortization of the redemption payments made by AIA to Donna up until May 2008. (R.3349;
R. 1067-1189.) Ms. Duclos declared, under oath, that there was neither record of shareholders
authorizing the use of capital surplus to redeem Donna's shares nor was there record of
shareholder authorization to increase the amount of interest paid to Donna over the amortization
period to prime plus 1/i% from prime less 1 Yi%. (R. 2708-09; 3349.) While Donna argues that
Ms. Duclos committed perjury, to further substantiate the claims she made in her affidavit, Ms.
Duclos provided the minutes from multiple corporate shareholder meetings implicitly showing
AIA shareholder consensus that the interest rate of Donna's redemption was prime less 1 Yi%.
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(R. 2710-20; 3349.) In light of this uncontroverted evidence, the court elected to reverse its prior
holding, as is its right, based on a motion to reconsider. (R. 3346-50.)
Donna also argues that AIA shareholders authorized the increase in interest on March 7,
1995, when they approved the catch all phrase, "All other corporate actions necessary to
recapitalize and reorganize the Company .. .in accordance with the reorganization plan approved
by the Board of Directors." (R. 3505.) Donna believes that this, plus the elements listed in the
Reorganization Plan which states the intended change in Donna's redemption terms, equals
shareholder authorization of the interest rate and amortization period of her redemption.
However, the Reorganization Plan, and its implementation were contingent upon AIA obtaining
capital through private placement, which did not occur. (R. 3512-14.)
B. Additionally, the 1995 Letters were replaced by the 1996 PSA and cannot
be reanimated.

Donna argues that the 1995 Letters were substituted by the 1996 PSA, and because the 1996
PSA is illegal, the 1995 Letters should be enforced. However, a substituted contract is a contract
that the obligee has accepted in satisfaction of an already existing duty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 279(1). Further, a " ... substituted contract discharges the original duty and
breach of the substituted contract by the obligor does not give the obligee a right to enforce the
original duty." Id at (2). It is the case that if the substituted contract is voidable, then the original
duty is enforceable upon avoidance. Id at cmt. b. However, this is only the case in the event that
the contract is voidable due to " ... mistake, misrepresentation, duress or unconscionability ... " Id.
None of those elements are present in this case. In fact, the 1996 SRA expressly states "This
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agreement supersedes and replaces the [1995] Letter Agreements in their entirety. The Letter
Agreement shall hereafter have no further force or effect." Further, the plain language of the
1996 PSA states; "Eberle Berlin and you [Donna's attorney] will mutually prepare a draft of a
definitive settlement agreement incorporating the foregoing terms and other documents
necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agreement." (R. 604, page 4 of January 11, 1995 letter).
Allowing Donna to exhume the 1995 Letters would force AIA to carry out an illegal contract.

See Farrell v. Whiteman, 164 Idaho 604, 200 P.3d 1153 (2009); (R. 3346-3351.) Therefore, the
parties were left where the law found which means that all but 7, 110 of Donna's shares had been
redeemed by AIA at the original interest rate of prime less 1 Vi%.
C. The 1987 Articles are a valid and enforceable contract between Donna
and AIA, the terms of which could not be adopted or modified without
shareholder approval.
Donna argues that the 1987 Articles represent a valid and enforceable contract between
herself and AIA under which she and AIA may elect to modify at any time irrespective of
shareholder approval or authorization. Donna relies on a District Court opinion in the southern
District of Illinois in which that court ruled that redemption terms of preferred stock issues
creates a contract between the corporation and the shareholder which is modifiable, simply
because it is a contract. Franklin Life Ins.Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 415 F.Supp. 602,
613 (D.C. Ill. 1978); Ore-Ida Potato Prod., Inc. v Larsen, 83 Idaho 290, 293, 362 P.2d 384, 384
(1961 ). However, Donna fails to take into consideration that the contract which contains her
redemption terms is contained in the 1987 Articles. As addressed above, under Idaho law once a
shareholder's shares were issued, any amendments to the corporation's Articles of Incorporation
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must be adopted by the Board of Directors and subsequently submitted to the shareholders for
approval. LC.§ 30-1-1003 (recodified as LC.§ 30-29-1003).
In this case, AIA's Articles of Incorporation were amended in 1987 via board and
shareholder approval. (R. 646-63.) Those Articles were amended further in 1995, but the
redemption price of preferred shares is at a rate of $10.00 per share, in monthly payments
amortized over fifteen (15) years at an interest rate of prime less 1 Yz% the same as stated in the
1987 Articles. (R. 688; 660.) Thus, because the 1995 Letters are invalid and unenforceable, the
contract between Donna and AIA is contained within the 1987 Articles. Amendments to a
corporation's Articles of Incorporation must be approved by both the corporation's board and
shareholders. Because AIA shareholders did not approve any amendments to Donna's
redemption terms, the District Court was correct in holding that Donna's redemption terms are
contained in the 1987 Articles.
Further, Donna claims that only her consent was needed to modify the terms of the
redemption in the 1987 Articles based on Paragraph 4.12 which states: "The rights and
preferences hereby conferred on the Stated Value Preferred Stock shall not be changed,
altered or revoked without the consent of the holders of the majority of the Stated Value
Preferred Stock outstanding at the time." (R. 660.) This language does not confer any
powers on Donna to alter the Articles unilaterally; it only prohibits AIA Services from
changing, altering, or revoking the rights and preferences conferred on Donna without her
consent. The language in the Articles is clear; it does not grant Donna unilateral authority to
modify the redemption terms without shareholder approval.
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D. The defense of ultra vires is not prohibited under J.C. § 30-1-7

Donna argues that the defendants are prohibited from raising an ultra vires defense to the
1995 Letter Agreements, assuming that the changes contained therein were not authorized by
AIA shareholders. However, Donna has confused ultra vires acts with illegal acts. An ultra vires
act is one that is beyond the scope of power granted by a corporate charter or law. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The defense of ultra vires is contained in Idaho Code § 30-1-7,
now repealed, which states "No act of a corporation ... shall be invalidated by reason of the fact
that the corporation was without capacity or power to do such act ... " I.C. § 30-1-7 (repealed). In
contrast, an illegal act is expressly prohibited by statute or public policy. Taylor at 564. As such,
the defense of illegality turns on whether a statute or other public policy forbids the act or
agreement. See Pines Grazing Ass 'n, Inc, v. Flying Joseph Ranch, LLC, 151 Idaho
924,928,265 P.3d 1136, 1140 (2011) (quoting Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6, 56 P.3d
765, 768 (2002)).
In this case, AIA is not asserting the 1995 Letters fall within the ultra vires
defense, rather it is asserting that the 1996 PSA and the 1995 Letter Agreements are
illegal because they violated LC. § 30-1-1003 (repealed) and LC. § 30-1-6 (repealed),
the governing law at the various times at issue. Further, other courts have confirmed this
distinction. 8 Thus, Donna's argument that the defendants are claiming that the 1995
Letters are ultra vires is misguided and inaccurate.

8

See Southwestern Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Gilmer, 123 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Tex. 1954), aff'd,
224 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1955); Stevens v. Boyes Hot Springs Co., 113 Cal. App. 479, 298 Pac. 508
(1931).
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E. An illegal contract cannot be made valid by invoking waiver or
estoppel.

Donna argues (as did Reed in the Taylor case) that AIA and the individual
defendants are estopped from asserting that the 1995 Letters are void. However, this
Court has already addressed this issue in the Taylor case when it ruled " ... an illegal
contract 'cannot be treated as valid by invoking waiver or estoppel."' Taylor at 565.
Further she argues, in near incoherency, that AIA and the individual shareholders
should be estopped from challenging the validity and enforceability of the 1995 Letters
because to do so would benefit them and would defeat the ends of justice. Again, this is
irrelevant as AIA and the individual defendants are not asserting the defense of ultra

vires; however, this argument is addressed in tum.
First, Donna relies on Meholin v. Carlson, 17 Idaho 742,710 P. 755(1910). In
that case this Court ruled that a party who benefited from an agreement cannot question
its validity. Meholin at 762. In that case, the appellant entered into a contract with a
bank to have stock issued in his name based on a promissory note. Id at 762.
Subsequently, the appellant in that case argued that he was not liable on that note
because the bank could not receive its own stock as collateral. Id at 763. This Court
ruled that the doctrine of ultra vires should not prevail when to do so would accomplish
a legal wrong. Id at 764. However, because neither party specially pled the defense of

ultra vires, it was unavailable. Id. In the present case, neither side has pled the defense
of ultra vires and therefore, Donna's argument is irrelevant to this matter.
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Second, Donna relies on First National Bank v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho
627, 155 P.673 (1916). In that case, two men entered into a contract with Callahan
Mining Company to purchase 400,000 shares of treasury stock in return for payment of
$100,000. First Nat'l Bank at 636. However, Callahan only delivered 176,000 of those
shares and the men subsequently sued to which Callahan replied that the contract was
barred by the defense of ultra vires. Id at 63 7. This Court ruled that Callahan could not
plead ultra vires to only those provisions benefitting the two men. Id at 641. As such,
Callahan was estopped from using the ultra vires defense.
In this case, AIA and the individual defendants have not pled ultra vires as a
defense to provisions in the 1995 Letters relating to Donna and her ownership of stock
or the interest rate related to that stock. As a result, her argument is irrelevant as it is an
attempt to force this Court to deny a defense which AIA has not raised. Therefore, this
Court should not address any argument relating to the ultra vires doctrine.

F. Donna's argument that the 1995 Letter Agreements are valid are
erroneous as she failed to present evidence that at the time those
letters were exchanged, AIA had capital surplus, earned surplus,
or was solvent.

Further, Donna argues that the 1995 Letter Agreements are valid because AIA's 1989
Amended Articles contained a provision allowing the corporation to purchase its own shares "to
the extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefor and to the extent of
unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available therefor." (R. 681.) That provision was not
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included in the March 7, 1995 Amended Articles, and its inclusion in the 1989 Articles does not
support Donna's argument for several reasons.

First, the Letter Agreements were dated January 11, 1995, March 22, 1995, July 18,
1995, and August 10, 1995. Only the first letter fell within the time of the 1989 Amended
Articles, and that letter was superseded by the July 18, 1995 letter. (R. 602-625.) The July 18,
1995 Letter does not include the provision in the January 11th letter that states the change in
amortization of Donna's shares will be effective "regardless of the outcome of the private
placement." (compare R. 602-04 with R. 608-12.)
Second, whether or not the shareholders authorized the corporation to invade capital
surplus to redeem Donna's shares is irrelevant because she did not present any evidence AIA
had either "unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus" or "unrestricted capital surplus" at the
time of the Letter Agreements. In fact, in 1995, AIA had substantial deficits across the board. (R.
2030.)
Third, the closing sentence of Paragraph 12 of the 1989 Amended Articles states "The
Corporation may not purchase or pay for its own shares at a time when the Corporation is
insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it insolvent."9 (R. 681). The record

9

The 1987 Articles also provided that redemption could occur from "legally available funds ... but only to the extent
such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's redemption of
its own shares. (Paragraph 4.2(a), R., 651)
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demonstrates that in 1995, when the Letter Agreements were signed, AIA had a net deficit of
($10,650,150) according to the accountant Donna retained. (R. 2030).
Thus, Donna has failed to meet her burden of showing the corporation's financial status
at the time of the Letter Agreements met any of the required tests (earned surplus, capital surplus
if authorized by the shareholders, or solvency) for the Letter Agreements to comply with Idaho's
restrictions on when a corporation may redeem its own shares.
4. The District Court did not err when it denied Donna's partial Motion for
Summary Judgment.
A. This Court has consistently ruled that orders denying motions for
summary judgment are not subject to review.

This Court has the power to " ... reverse, affirm, or modify any order or judgment
appealed from ... " LC. § 1-205. This Court has also set precedent relating to orders
denying summary judgment stating, "As a general rule, the denial of a motion for
summary judgment is not appealable even when the appeal is from a subsequent final
judgment." Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323, 328, 336 P.3d 256, 262 (2014). However,
this Court will allow permissive appeals to orders that are otherwise not appealable if
" ... the order involved a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
grounds for indifference of opinion and under which an immediate appeal from the
order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." Riley at
329.
In her appeal, Donna argues that the Court should make an exception

to its

general rule and vacate the lower court's order denying her motion for partial summary
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judgment and the order declaring Donna holds 7, 110 preferred shares in AIA. Donna
argues that the number of shares Donna held in AIA, at the time AIA made its last
payment to her, was 41,651. (R. 2199.) However, that amount was based on AIA's
redemption payments made to Donna at the interest rate of prime plus 114%. (R. 1127-44;
1187-89.) It was later discovered that the documents allowing this increased rate (1995
Letters and 1996 PSA) were in fact illegal and unenforceable based on governing Idaho
Code at the time those agreements were entered into.
There is no dispute as to the fact that Donna has been paid $2,696,797.80 in
redemption payments. (R. 1187-89.) This Court has ruled that courts must leave the
parties where the law finds them and neither enforce the illegal contract nor enforce
" ... any alleged rights directly springing from such contract." Riley at 338. Based on this
ruling, the District Court correctly re-calculated Donna's remaining shares in AIA based
on the true interest rate that should have been applicable throughout the course of AIA's
payments to Donna; prime less 1 Vi%. (R. 3346-50.) As a result, the District Court
correctly ordered that all but 7, 110 of Donna's shares in AIA have been redeemed.
Therefore, there is no basis for this Court to overrule precedent and separately
consider the denial of Donna's motion for summary judgment. The redemption
payments made by AIA to Donna should have been amortized at the lower interest rate
of prime less 1 Vi %. This issue does not involve a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial grounds for indifference of opinion and under which an
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immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly
resolution of the litigation.

B. Donna's claim that the Individual Defendants are liable to her
under the Alter-Ego doctrine should not be addressed by this
Court as it is beyond the scope of this appeal.
Donna urges this Court to pierce the corporate veil and hold the individual defendants
liable under the theory of alter-ego. However, this claim is not ripe to be addressed in this appeal
as Donna's alter ego allegation was not part of the IRCP 54(b) Judgment. (R. 3438-40.) As such,
the District Court was correct to deny Donna's motion for summary judgment on that issue.

Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 591-92, 329 P.3d 368, 37374 (2014). In addition, the court declined to grant summary judgment to Donna on the alter ego
doctrine because it found there were genuine issues of material fact on whether Donna had met
her burden of establishing the required elements to invoke the alter ego doctrine. (R. 2608.)
If this Court is inclined to depart from precedent and consider the denial of a motion for
summary judgment on appeal, the Defendants ask that the Court find that doctrine does not apply
in this case. In order to apply the alter-ego doctrine, the following must be found: there is a unity
of interest and ownership to a point where the personalities of the corporation and the individual
are not existent, and if the acts are treated as those of the corporation, an inequitable result would
follow. Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 556-57, 165 P.3d 261, 270-71 (2007). In the

Vanderford case, a managing member of the Defendant corporation, Pine Townhomes, LLC,
paid himself through the LLC's bank account. Id at 557. However, the account was so badly
managed that an accountant could not differentiate between funds belonging to the member and
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the LLC. Id. As such, this Court determined that the trial court was correct in allowing a jury to
determine whether to pierce the corporate veil and apply the alter ego doctrine. Id.
Unlike the Vanderford case, the record in this case is replete with examples of the fact
that AIA observed the corporate formalities such as: having Articles of Incorporation (R. 649702); maintaining annual reports (R. 2650 - 2672); keeping minutes of board and shareholders
meetings (R. 2710-2720, 2808-17.); and having excellent financial records (R. 1746.) Further,
the individual Defendants cannot be held personally responsible to redeem Donna's shares
because at the time the 1987 Articles were adopted, none of the individual defendants were in
control over or owned a controlling interest in AIA: John Taylor was a minority shareholder and
the Secretary of the Corporation (R. 2647;) Cashman and Beck had no involvement in AIA prior
to 1995 (R. 2754, 2771) and Connie had no involvement in AIA prior to 2007 (R. 2724-25.) This
shows separate and distinct corporate .and individual personalities lacking unity of interest and
ownership to the point where the actions of the individual defendants cannot be held to be those
of the corporation. Thus, there is no legal basis for holding any of the individual Defendants
responsible for redeeming Donna's shares.
C. The District Court did not err in dismissing Donna's claims of fraud and
constructive fraud under the Economic Loss Rule.

In Idaho, the Economic Loss Rule generally applies in negligence cases. Ramerth

v. Heart, 133 Idaho 194, 197, 983 P.2d 848, 851 (1999). There are two exceptions to
this general rule: (1) where a special relationship exists among the parties and (2) where
there are unique circumstances that require a reallocation of the risk. Aardema v. US.
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Dairy Sys., 147 Idaho 785, 792, 215 P.3d 505, 512 (2009). For the court to find a special
relationship, one of two situations must exist: ( 1) where a professional or quasiprofessional is performing services or (2) where an entity holds itself out to the public
as being an expert regarding a special function, and by doing so, knowingly induces
reliance by the other party on its performance of that function. Id.
Donna argues that this Court should create a special relationship between herself
and the individual defendants based on the individual defendant's fiduciary duties owed
to her vis-a-vis AJA. By doing so, Donna is asking this Court to allow Donna to seek
tort remedies in a contract cause of action. The District Court correctly noted that Donna's
loss is purely economic, and recognized Idaho's appellate courts have consistently held that,
unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule precludes recovery of purely economic losses
in tort actions absent an accompanying physical injury to persons or property, unique
circumstances, or a special relationship. Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass 'n, 126 Idaho
1002, 1007-08, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200-01 (1995). The court correctly determined that none of
those exceptions to the economic loss rule applied. First, Donna makes no claim of physical
injury to persons or property; as the court noted "Donna has presented the Court with no facts"
which would place her economic loss into the unique circumstances exception. (R. 2419.)
Second, there is no special relationship between Donna and the individual defendants as the
District Court correctly noted that Idaho has only recognized the "special relationship" exception
in an extremely limited context, which does not exist in this case. (R. 2419.)
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In the absence of Idaho precedent on the question of whether the economic loss rule
applied in cases claiming intentional torts as opposed to negligence involving corporate directors
and officers, the District Court looked to Washington State; specifically the "independent duty
doctrine," which provides that when determining if tort remedies are recoverable when a
contractual relationship exists and the losses are purely economic, the appropriate inquiry is
whether an independent legal duty exists outside the parties' contractual relationship.

Hendrickson v. Tender Care Animal Hosp. Corp., 312 P.3d 52, 176 Wash.App. 757
(Wash.Ct.App. 2013). In this case, Donna's shareholder status was created by contract with the
right of redemption if and when it can be done in compliance with the restrictions on stock
purchases contained in the Idaho Business Corporations act. (R. 646-63.) Based on this, the
District Court correctly ruled the relationship of director/shareholder does not fall within the
extremely limited group of special relationships recognized under Idaho law.
The District Court further clarified this ruling in its Opinion & Order on Motions to
Reconsider when it stated Donna's fraud claims in the instant matter are duplicative ("merely a
regurgitation") of her breach of fiduciary duty claims, and again ruled that there is no
independent legal duty that exists outside the parties' contractual relationship. (R. 2606) Thus, no
matter how she cloaks her claims, whether in contract or tort, in this case she is not entitled to
anything other than redemption of her remaining shares. 10

10

Donna's lawyer is pursuing a shareholder derivative action in Idaho federal court. That is the appropriate vehicle
for Donna's fiduciary duty claims.
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D. The District Court erred in holding that Donna's claims of breach of
fiduciary duty were not barred by the Economic Loss Rule.

In this Cross Appeal, the Defendants ask this court to reverse the District Court's ruling,
on reconsideration, that the economic loss rule does not bar Donna's breach of fiduciary duty
claims. The requested ruling would be a narrow one based on the specific facts of this case, i.e.
as a Preferred Shareholder, regardless of the causes of actions Donna pleads, the only remedy
available to her is redemption of her Series A shares. Donna claims that the Defendants took
actions that injured AIA's assets or the whole body of its stock; as the District Court noted, this
is a claim that may only be brought in a derivative action and is not proper in a direct action. (R.
2606.)
Other courts in determining whether the economic loss rule precludes fiduciary duty
claims have taken a common sense approach. In Florida, courts have held that the economic loss
rule does not automatically bar a breach of fiduciary duty claim; however, the rule does apply
when the claim for breach of fiduciary duty is based upon and inextricably intertwined with a
claim for breach of contract. Action Nissan, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, 617 F. Supp. 2d
1177 (M.D. Fla. 2008). Thus, a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty will not survive
where that claim is dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the
parties. That result follows because the duty is owed only as a result of the existence of the
contract. The Michael Titze Co. Inc. v. Simon Property Group, Inc., 400 Fed. Appx. 455 (11th
Cir. 2010); Excess Risk Underwriters, Inc. v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (S.D.
Fla. 2002).
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Colorado follows the same approach. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court, in Town
of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000) (en bane), analyzed the source

and contours of the economic loss rule. In that case, the court found that the essential difference
between a tort obligation and a contract obligation is the source of the duties of the parties:
A breach of a duty which arises under the provisions of a contract between the
parties must be redressed under contract, and a tort action will not lie. A breach of
a duty arising independently of any contract duties between the parties, however,
may support a tort action. Id. (quoting Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co.
v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 320 S.C. 49, 463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1995))
(emphasis in original). Pertinent to this Court's analysis, the Town of Alma court
went on to recognize that the "tort" of "breach of fiduciary duty" is "expressly
designed to remedy pure economic loss" and that any confusion arising from
application of the economic loss rule in such instance can be avoided "by
maintaining the focus on the source of the duty alleged to have been violated." Id.
at 1263
This was also recently decided in the Southern District of New York, in which that court
ruled that the economic loss rule precludes a fiduciary duty claim when the plaintiff is seeking
only the benefit of a contract:
Plaintiffs' allegations that Defendant breached duties independent of its contracts
do not, themselves, allow evasion of the economic loss rule, which presents a
second, distinct barrier" to tort claims stemming from contractual relationships.
The economic-loss rule provides that "a contracting party seeking only a benefit
of the bargain recovery may not sue in tort notwithstanding the use of familiar tort
language in its pleadings.
BlackRock Allocation Target Shares: Series S. Portfolio v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'! Ass'n, 2017

WL 1194683, at* 15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017)(internal citations omitted).
In this case, the individual defendants' only duties to Donna relate to her status as a
shareholder, which is inextricably intertwined with AIA's agreement to redeem her shares. As
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such, the only remedy Donna should be allowed to seek in this action is the redemption of her
remaining Series A shares pursuant to the terms of the 1987 Articles. For those reasons, her
fiduciary duty claims should be barred by the economic loss rule.
E. The District Court did not err when it dismissed Donna's claim for unjust
enrichment.

Donna alleges that the individual defendants have unjustly benefitted, to her detriment,
because AIA has not redeemed all of her shares thus far. Specifically, she claims that by agreeing
to defer five monthly redemption payments and consenting to the Reorganization Plan, she
somehow enabled the individual defendants to gain operational control of the AIA and as a
result, the individual shareholders looted AIA for their own personal benefit. The District Court
was correct in ruling Donna had failed to meet the burden of making out a prima facie case
against the individual defendants for unjust enrichment. (R. 2422.)
Unjust enrichment occurs when a defendant receives a benefit from the plaintiff that
would be inequitable to retain without compensation to the extent that retention is unjust. Beco
Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). Additionally,

the alleged recipient must also be the intended beneficiary of said benefit. Hettinga v. Synbrandy,
126 Idaho 467, 471, 886 P .2d 772, 77 6 (1994 ). Recovery for unjust enrichment is unavailable if
the benefits [to the recipient] were created incidentally by [the claimant] in pursuit of his own
financial advantage. Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 897, 277 P.3d 337 (2012). In this case,
Donna contends, without citing evidence in the record, she provided a benefit to the individual
Defendants. Further, the District Court, looking at all available evidence stated:
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"Donna, by agreeing to allow AIA to defer five months of stock redemption
payments in order to allow AIA to develop CropUSA, conferred a benefit on the
corporation, not on the named individual Defendants, nor is there any evidence
Donna intended the individual Defendants to benefit. Any benefit enjoyed by the
individual Defendants was incidentally created as a result of Donna's pursuit of
her own financial advantage. Therefore, recovery for unjust enrichment against
the individuals Defendants is unavailable to Donna." (R. 2422-23.)
Donna goes on to list a various sources of "evidence" she contends is proof of her claim
of unjust enrichment while simultaneously admitting that evidence is outside the scope of
this appeal. As such, this Court should not consider those arguments, and should affirm
the District Court order dismissing her claim of unjust enrichment.
5. The District Court erred
counterclaim.

in

dismissing AIA's

breach of contract

In its response to Donna's Third Amended Complaint, AIA counterclaimed that by
entering into a clandestine subordination agreement reversing the order of redemption priority
between herself and Reed, she breached the contract she entered into with AIA in 1996 and the
1995 Letter Agreements, if those agreements are held valid and enforceable. (R. 60-62 (A. 1) 11 .)
Section 8(d) of the Series A PSA provision (R. 624 (A. 2).) required AIA's written consent to
any amendment, modification, waiver or supplement to said agreement. Additionally, the
subordination Agreement allowed Reed to bring suit for the principal owed to him by AIA on his
then existing note. (R. 1040 (A. (3).) The District Court denied AIA's motion for summary
judgment on that issue, stating "one cannot breach an illegal agreement." (R. 2428 (A. 4).) This
ruling did not take into account the fact that the 1995 Letter Agreements also contained a

"(A. 1)- "A" refers to the appendix of this brief and correlated numbers such as "l" refer to the exhibit number
attached thereto.
11
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provision subordinating payments to Reed. The District Court incorrectly ruled that Donna was
the only beneficiary to the priority of payment, and it was her right to waive and to do so without
legal obligation to first obtain the consent of AIA. (R. 2428 (A. 4).).
However, the District Court failed to take into consideration the fact that the
subordination agreement (whether in the Letter Agreements or in the PSA) was not simply an
agreement between Reed and Donna; AIA was also a party. (R. 602-04 (A. 5).) AIA was most
certainly a beneficiary of the subordination agreement originally agreed to in the January 11,
1995 Letter Agreement, because it allowed the corporation to forestall making principal
payments on Reed's $6,000,000 note. (R. 602-04 (A. 5).) When Reed and Donna unilaterally
reversed the order of priority, which was contained in both the Letter Agreement and the PSA, it
had a devastating financial impact on AIA in two ways: First, it made it legally impossible for
AIA to pay Donna without being at jeopardy of a lawsuit by Reed, but when the company
stopped making payments in 2008, she promptly filed suit (R. 86-88; 11-25; 617-25 (A. 3; 6;
2).)Second, the reverse subordination agreement had a substantial adverse effect on AIA as it
enabled Reed to immediately sue AIA for the full amount owed under his stock redemption
agreement, rather than being entitled to interest only, which is what he did. See generally, Taylor

v. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552,261 P.3d 829 (2011).
In addition, when Donna had agreed to subordinate all amounts and obligations owed to
her by AIA to Reed, she failed to disclose this fact to AIA and as a result, continued to receive
payments from the company. (R. 1746 (A. 7).) From the time she entered into the subordination
agreement in 2006, until AIA was advised that her PSA was an illegal and unenforceable
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contract, she received $175,000 in payments that she had no right to receive. (R.1746 (A. 7).)
Therefore, AIA asks that this Court reverse the order dismissing AIA' s counterclaim.
VI.
1.

COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Donna is not entitled to costs or fees on appeal.
Donna requests an award of costs and fees on appeal based on Idaho App. R. 40 and 41,

as well as Idaho Code § 12-121. However, she is not entitled to fees under any of those
provisions for two reasons: (1) She was not a prevailing party below, and (2) the Respondents'
defense in this appeal is not frivolous. An award of reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to
the prevailing party if it is found that the case was brought, defended frivolously, or defended
unreasonably without foundation. Idaho Code § 12-121. However, this statutory power is
discretionary. Minich v. Gem State Developers, 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078 1085 (1979).
Further, it is not the case that this Court will award attorney's fees as a matter of right or against
a losing party who brought an appeal in good faith with genuine issues. Id. As such, if this Court
is inclined to consider Donna a prevailing party, it is the case that AIA and the individual
defendants have presented, in good faith, genuine issues to this Court and as a result, Donna
should not be entitled to attorney's fees or costs.
2.

The Respondents are entitled to costs and fees on appeal as Donna's claims are
frivolous attempts at re-litigating the same issues.
Lastly, AIA and the individual defendants request that this Court find that Donna's

appeal was pursued frivolously and without foundation, and award costs and attorney fees on
appeal. Idaho Code § 12-121; Idaho App. R. 40-41. Further, those costs and fees should also be
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assessed against Donna's counsel under IRCP 1 l(c)(3)-(4). Under Idaho R. Civ. P. 1 l(c)(3)-(4),
this Court has the discretion to impose sanctions on an attorney when he files suit for an
improper purpose, such as harassment or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation. Idaho R.
Civ. P. 1 l(b)(l)
This appeal is, essentially, nothing more than an attempt to revisit issues which have been
raised and rejected in prior appeals to this Court. 12 If Donna and, more importantly, her counsel,
are not required to pay for the consequences of their actions, they will continue to file new
lawsuits in an effort to re-litigate the same issues. This piecemeal litigation has effectively
destroyed AIA and burdened an ever expanding class of targeted defendants with extravagant
litigation costs. Reed and Donna have never taken their claims to trial, have been decided against
multiple times at the District Court level, and on subsequent appeal. Yet, Reed and Donna,
through counsel, continue to wage a war of attrition with little concern regarding the
frivolousness of their claims or the destructive nature of this perpetual litigation.

VII.

CONCLUSION

For the afore-mentioned reasons, the Respondents respectfully request that this court:
1. Affirm the dismissal of Donna's contract claim against AIA in CV 13-01075
2. Affirm the dismissal of Donna's claims for fraud and aiding and abetting fraud in CV 0801150
3. Affirm the dismissal of Donna's claims for unjust enrichment in both cases
See generally: Taylor v. McNichols and Taylor v. Babbitt (consolidated); 149 Idaho 826,243. P.3d 642 (2010);
Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829(2011 ); Taylor v. Riley and Taylor v. Eberle Berlin
(consolidated), 157 Idaho 323, 336 P.3d 256 (2014); and Taylor v. Riley II, just decided at S. Ct. Docket No. 436862015.
12
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4. Reverse the dismissal of AIA's counterclaim for breach of contract in CV 13-01075
5. A ward costs and attorney fees on appeal to the Respondents.

Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of October, 2017.

Martin J. Martelle
Attorney for Respondents
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIS1RICT OF THE
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DONNAJ. TAYLOR,

12

Plaintiff,
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16
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18

vs.

No. CV-13-01075
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION'S
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
AND COUNTERCLAIM

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR;
CONNIE TAYLOR HENDERSON;
JAMES W. BECK; and MICHAEL W.
CASHMAN, SR.,

19

Defendants.

20
21
22

Defendant A.I.A. Services Corporation answers plaintiff's complaint as follows:
1.

Defendant does not have sufficient knowledge or information to form a

23
24

25
26

belief as to the truth or accuracy of paragraph 1 and therefore denies the same.
2.

Defendant admits it is an Idaho corporation having its principal offices in

Lewiston, Idaho. The remaining allegations of paragraph 2 appear to be directed to

27
28

' j

entities that are neither named as defendants or otherwise identified, and do not require
an answer from this defendant.
ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
AND COUNTERCLAIM - 1

RANDALL I DANSKIN
A ProlessionalService Corporation
1500 BANK OF AMERICA FINANCIAL CENTER
601 WESI' RIVERSIDE AVENUE

SPOKANF., WASHINGTON 99201-()653
(509) 747-2052

54

1

2

3.

Defendant admits that R. John Taylor has been a director of AIA Services

Corporation since it was founded. The remaining allegations of paragraph 3 are directed

3
4

5
6

to defendant R. John Taylor and do not require an answer from this defendant

4.

The allegations of paragraph 4 are directed to defendant Connie Taylor

Henderson and do not require an answer from this defendant.

7

8
9

10

5.

The allegations of paragraph 5 are directed to defendant James Beck and

do not require an answer from this defendant.

6.

The allegations of paragraph 6 are directed to defendant Michael W.

11
12
13
14

Cashman, Sr. and do not require an answer from this defendant.

7.

Defendant denies paragraph 7 to the extent it contains an allegation.

8.

Defendant do~ not have sufficient knowledge or information to form a

15
16
17
18

belief as to the truth or accuracy of paragraph 8 and therefore denies the same.
9.

Defendant denies paragraph 9 to the extent it contains an allegation.

10.

Defendant admits it initiated a declaratory judgment action against

19

20
21
22

plaintiff and the other defendants named therein but denies the remaining allegations of
paragraph 10.
11.

Defendant denies paragraph 11 to the extent it contains an allegation.

12.

Defendant admits that Donna Taylor acquired 200,000 shares of Series A

23
24

25
26

Preferred Stock in 1987 pursuant to a property settlement agreement between her and
Reed Taylor entered into incident to their divorce. Defendant does not have sufficient

27
28

knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or accuracy of the remaining
allegations of paragraph 12 and therefore denies the same.

ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
AND COUNTERCLAIM - 2

RANDALL I DANSKIN
A Professional Service Corporation

1SOOBANKOFAMERICA~NANCIALCENTER
601 WESI' RIVERSIDE AVENUE
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON 99201-0653
(509) 747-2052
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1

2

13.

Defendant admits that amended and restated articles of incorporation were

filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on December 29, 1987. Defendant does not have

3

4
5
6

sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or accuracy of the
remaining allegations of paragraph 13 and therefore denies the same.
14.

Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 14.

15.

Defendant admits that it entered into a January 11, 1995 letter agreement

7

8
9

10

with Donna Taylor that, among other things, changed the interest rate and amortization
period for the redemption of Donna Taylor's remaining shares of Series A Preferred

11

12
13
14

Stock from that specified in AIA Services Corporation's amended and restated articles of
incorporation. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 15, including the
inference that the January 11, 1995 letter agreement was not expressly superseded and

15
16
17

18

replaced in its entirety by the July I, 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement.
16.

Defendant does not have sufficient knowledge or information to form a

belief as to the truth or accuracy of paragraph 16 and therefore denies the same.

19

20
21

22

17.

Defendant admits it entered into letter agreements with Donna Taylor on

July 18, 1995 and August 10, 1995 but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 17,
including the inference that these letter agreements were not expressly superseded and

23
24

25

26

replaced in their entirety by the July 1, 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement.
18.

Defendant admits it entered into the July 1, 1996 Series A Preferred

Shareholder Agreement but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 18.

27

28

19.

Defendant acknowledges that the price payable to Donna Taylor in

redemption of her remaining shares of Series A Preferred Stock was $443,478.47 as of
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I

1

February 21, 2008 but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 19, including the

2

inference that such redemption was not invalidated by the Idaho Supreme Court's

3
4

5
6

subsequent ruling in Reed Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation et al.
20.

Defendant admits it bas not made any payments to Donna Taylor since

May 2008 with respect to the redemption of her remaining shares of Series A Preferred

7
8

9
10

Stock but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 20.
21.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 21, specifically the

allegation that, if the July 1, 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholders Agreement is found to

11
12
13

14

be illegal or unenforceable, the January 11, 1995, July 18, 1995 and August 10, 1995
letter agreements are somehow revived.
22.

Defendant admits the amount payable to Donna Taylor in redemption of

15
16
17

18

her remaining shares of Series A Preferred Stock is approximately $82,000. Defendant
denies paragraph 22 to the extent it contains other allegations.
23.

Defendant admits it has not paid Donna Taylor according to her demands

19
20
21

22

but denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 23, including the inference that her
demands are valid.
24.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 24.

24

25.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 25.

25

26.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 26.

27.

Defendant admits that R. John Taylor has been the president and a director

23

26
27

28

since 1995. The remaining allegations of paragraph 27 are directed to defendant R John
Taylor and do not require an answer from this defendant.
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1
2

28.

Defendant admits that Connie Taylor Henderson has been a director since

2007. The remaining allegations of paragraph 28 are directed to defendant Connie Taylor

3
4

5
6

Henderson and do not require an answer from this defendant.
29.

Defendant admits that James Beck has been a director since 2007. The

remaining allegations of paragraph 29 are directed to defendant James Beck and do not

7
8

9
10

require an answer from this defendant.
30.

Defendant admits that Michael W. Cashman, Sr. has been a director for

several years starting in 1995. The remaining allegations of paragraph 30 are directed to

11
12
13
14

defendant Michael W. Cashman, Sr. and do not require an answer from this defendant.
31.

The allegations of paragraphs 31 through 36 and paragraphs 39 through 41

are dir~cted to other defendants and do not require an answer from this defendant.

15
16
17
18

32.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 37 insofar as they are

directed to this defendant.
33.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 38, including the inference

19
20
21
22

that it has any obligation to Donna Taylor.
34.

Defendant answers paragraph 42 by reincorporating its answers to

paragraphs 1 through 41 as if fully set forth herein.

23
24

35.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 43.

25

36.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 44.

37.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 45.

26
27
28

ANSWER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
AND COUNTERCLAIM - 5

RANDALL I DANSKIN

A Professional Service Corporation
1500 BANK OF AMERICA FINANCIAL CENTER
601 WEST RIVERSIDE AVENUE
SPOl<ANE, WASHINGTON 99201-<1653

(509) 747-2052

58

1

2

38.

I,,

The allegations of paragraphs 46 through 56 are either directed to other

defendants and do not require an answer from this defendant or do not contain an

3
4

allegation requiring an answer.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

5
6

Defendant asserts the following by way of affirmative defense:

7
8

9

10

1.

Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

I,,

,.·_

granted.
2.

Plaintiff's complaint fails to plead with requisite particularity the acts and

11

12
13
14

conduct upon which her claims are predicated.
3.

Plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party to this action.

4.

Pbµntj.ff's claims are barred by the doc_trines of issue preclusion or res

15
16

17
18

judicata, and claims preclusion or collateral estoppel.
5.

Plaintiffs claims are barred because they are the subject of a previously

filed, pending action or actions in this and other courts.

19

20

6.

Plaintiff's claims are barred by substantive unconscionability or her
:.·_.

21

22

f:•

r,··

violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.

7.

Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver or estoppel.

8.

Plaintiff's claims are barred in whole or in part by applicable statutes of

23

24
25

26

I

limitation or laches.
9.

Plaintiff's damages, if any, were caused by her own acts, conduct and

27
28

omissions.
10.

Plaintiff's claims are barred by her unclean hands.
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COUNTERCLAIM

1
2

AlA Services Corporation alleges and states the following by way of

3
4

counterclaim against Donna J. Taylor:

5
6

1.

The July 1, 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholders Agreement was entered

into coincident with AIA Services Corporation's and Reed Taylor's execution of an

7
8
9

10

agreement that restructured AlA Services Corporation's obligations to Reed Taylor under
a July 12, 1995 stock redemption agreement between AIA Services Corporation and Mr.
Taylor.

11
12
13

14

2.

The July 1, 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholders Agreement provided,

among other things, that it could not be amended or modified without the approval or
consent of all of the p~ies to the agreement, including_ AIA Services Corporation.

15
16
17
18

3.

In December 2006 Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor signed a subordination

agreement (hereafter, the "Subordination Agreement") prepared on Reed Taylor's behalf
by the attorney representing Donna Taylor in this action. The Subordination Agreement

19
20
21
22

r~versed the order of subordination set forth in the July 1, 1996 Series A Preferred
Shareholders Agreement to enable Reed Taylor to demand and receive payments for his
common stock pursuant to the July 12, 1995 redemption agreement prior to the full

23

24
25

26

redemption of Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Stock.

4.

AIA Services Corporation was not informed of the Subordination

Agreement prior to its execution.

27
28

5.

AIA Services Corporation did not consent to, ratify or otherwise approve

the Subordination Agreement.
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6.

1

2

Following execution of the Subordination Agreement, Reed Taylor sued

AIA Services Corporation and others in this court to compel AIA Services Corporation to

3

4

redeem his common stock in AIA Services Corporation. This lawsuit culminated in the

5

Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Reed Taylor v. AJA Services Corporation et al. that the

6

July 12, 1995 redemption agreement between Reed Taylor and AIA Services Corporation

7
8

was illegal and unenforceable.

7.

9
10

But for the Subordination Agreement, Reed Taylor could not have

demanded redemption of his common stock in AIA Services Corporation when he did,

11
12

nor sued AIA Services Corporation and others as he did.

8.

13
14

But for the Subordination Agreement, Donna Taylor would have had no

conceivable basis for suing AIA Services Corporation, R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor

15
16

17
18

Henderson, James Beck or Michael W. Cashman, Sr. in this or any of the other myriad
actions she has brought with respect to the redemption of her remaining shares of Series
A Preferred Stock.

19
9.

20
21

By signing the Subordination Agreement Donna Taylor breached the July

1, 1996 Series A Preferred Shareholders Agreement.

22

10.

AIA Services Corporation has incurred and paid hundreds of thousands of

23
24

25
26

dollars in attorneys' fees and costs since the Subordination Agreement as signed,
responding to the various lawsuits described above. Any damages that are awarded to
Donna Taylor in this action should be offset by these attorneys' fees and costs.

27

28

II
II
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1

DATED this 17th day of June, 2013.

2

RANDALL I DANSKlN

3

~ }>. 8;1,,11wn-- ~

4

Douglas Siddoway, ISB

5

No.238!0

Attorneys for Defendant AIA Services
Corporation
601 W. Riverside, Suite 1500
Spokane, WA 9920 I
(509) 747-2052 (telephone)
(509) 624-2528 (facsimile)
djs@randalldanskin.com

6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26
I

27

!

28
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MARTELLE & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
Martin J. Martelle, Attorney
Christopher Williams, Attorney
Vanessa Mooney, Legal Intern

380 W. State Street
Eagle, Idaho 83616-6048
Phone: (208) 938-8500
Fax: (208) 938-8503

September 27, 2017

ATTN: RONNIE A MORROW
Department of the Treasury - Appeals Office
Internal Revenue Service
Memphis Campus Appeals
PO Box 622, Stop 86
Memphis, TN 38101-0622

SENT VIA FACSIMILE
855-730-1989
PAGES
Confirmation Received

Re: RICHARD W. HERGERT
Taxpayer Identification No.: 518-58-5850
Dear Mr. Morrow:
Our office just faxed you a copy of Mr. Hergert's Offer in Compromise this morning. Mr.
Hergert felt the income figures weren't correct when he was signing the paperwork, and quickly
went to meet with his Certified Public Accountant. The Certified Public Accountant stated he
had an employee working on the Profit and Loss statement on her last day of working with the
Accounting Firm, and there could be errors in entries. His Certified Public Accountant reviewed
all income and expense entries that were made, and it turned out that this was the case. The
Certified Public Accountant updated the Profit and Loss Statement with corrected figures and
emailed it to us just moments ago. We're attaching it for your review.
As you know, this will change the figures on the 433-A (OIC) that was just faxed and mailed to
you. It will also change the cover letter that we prepared for the Offer in Compromise Unit. We
prepared this letter to try to explain the "extra income" that didn't truly exist. Again, this didn't
add up to the taxpayer, which is why he met with the Certified Public Accountant right away.
The total income we had listed on what was faxed to you this morning was $4,560.00. With this
change, the total income will now be $3,385.00; thus, leaving an excess income of only $67.00.
We're attaching an updated 433-B (OIC) that will be signed and returned to you next Monday,
October 2"ct. We're also attaching a copy of the updated cover letter for the Offer Unit that will
need to replace the letter that is in the faxed/mailed copy.
We just wanted to make you aware of this before you started reviewing everything in advance of
our scheduled CDP Hearing on October 10th.

MARTELLE & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
Page Two:
We're requesting that once you replace the 433-A (OIC) that is in the faxed/mailed copy with the
signed copy we'll fax to you on Monday. You'll be receiving the mailed copy over the next few
days.
We're sincerely sorry for the confusion, and if you have any questions, please don't hesitate to
contact me. If I'm unavailable you may speak with my assistant, Dena Basauri. Her CAF
number is: 0303-36468R.

Kindest Regards,

MARTIN J. MARTELLE
Attorney at Law
MM/dmb
Enc.: As noted herein
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SERlES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT

TIDS SERIES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is
made and entered into this 1st day of July 1996, by and among All\ SERVICES CORPORATION,
an Idaho corporation ("Company"), REED J. TAYLOR ("Creditor) and DONNA J. TAYLOR
("Series A Preferred Shareholder").
1

I

RECITALS:
A.

Series A Preferred Shareholder is the owner of all of Company's issued and

outstanding Series A Preferred Stock. Company is redeeming that stock pursuant to (i) Company's
articles of incorporation and (ii) that certain letter agreement among the parties hereto and Cu mer

L. Green ("Green") dated January 11, 1995, as amended by (a) that certain letter from Green to
Richard A Riley (''Riley") dated March 22, 1995, (b) that certain letter agreement among the parties,
Green and Richard W. Campanaro dated July 18, 1995, and (c) that certain letter from Green to Riley
dated August 10, 1995 (collectively, the "Series A Preferred Shareholder Letter Agreements").
Pursuant to the Letter Agreements, Company has reamortized its redemption obligation to Series A
Preferred Shareholder over a shorter period and has increased the rate of interest paid to Series A
Preferred Shareholder in exchange of waiver by Series A Preferred Shareholder of alleged defaults
!

I

by Company and other consideration.
B.

Pursuant to that certain Stock_ Redemption Agreement between Company and

',I
'I
, I

Creditor dated July 22, 1995, as amended by that certain Addendum to Stock Redemption Agreement
also dated July 22, 1995 (together, the "Stock Redemption Agreement") and related agreements
i

including (without limitation) a Stock Pledge Agreement (the "Stock Pledge Agreement") and a

I

Security Agreement (the "Security Agreement"), each dated July 22, 1995, granting a security interest

617
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in certain collateral to secure payment of the $6M Note, all of Creditor's shares of com1no11 stock of
Company were redeemed.

C.

As part consideration of the redemption of Creditor's common stock, Company: (i)

executed a promissory note dated July 22, 199 5 payable to Creditor in the principal amount of

$1,500,000 (the "Down Payment Note") and (ii) executed a promissory note dated August 1, 1995
payable to Creditor in the principal amount of $6,000,000 (the "$6M Note").

D.

Simultaneously with the redemption of Creditor's common stock, the Company

reorganized by selling 150,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock for $1.5 million, contributing that
$1. 5 million to the Company's wholly-owned insurance subsidiary, The Universe Life Insurance

Company ("ULIC"), and distributing ULIC's stock of its subsidiary, .AJA Insurance, Inc. to the
Company ("Reorganization").
E.

In connection with the redemption of Creditor's common stock and Company's

reorganization., the parties entered into the Letter Agreement dated July 18, 1995 which, among other
things, imposed certain restrictions on Company's payment of interest and principal to Creditor.

F.

Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, Company and Creditor have entered

into that certain Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement (the "Restructure Agreement") pursuant
to which Company's obligations to Creditor under the Stock Redemption Agreement and related
agreements have been restructured (the "Restructure").

G.

As a part of the Restructure, Company and Creditor have agreed to amend and restate

the Down Payment Note (as amended pursuant to the Restructure, the "Amended Down Payment
Note"), the Security Agreement and the Stock Pledge Agreement.

H.

In consideration of Company's. willingness to accelerate principal payments to Series

A Preferred Shareholder on its redemption of the Series A Preferred Stock, the Series A Preferred
Shareholder is willing to release Company and Creditor from certain of those interest and principal
.
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I

payment restrictions contained in the Letter Agreements and to release Company from any and all
defaults under Company's Articles ofincorporation or the Letter Agreements, and to consent to the

iL .

restructure of Company's obligations to pay principal and interesno Creditor pursuant to the terms
of the An1ended Down Payment Note as provided therein and in the Restructure Agreement.

AGREEMENTS

1.

Series A Preferred Stock Redemption.
(a)

Company will continue monthly payments to Series A Prefen-ed Shareholder

in accordance with a ten year amortization (from the date redemption commenced) at prime rate plus
1!.i% pursuant to paragraph 1 of the January 11, 1995 Letter Agreement.

(b)

In addition to (and without affecting the amount of) the regular amortized

payment, Company wiU accelerate payment of principai by paying Series A Preferred Shareholder

$100,000 at the end of each six-month period beginning at the end of the six-month period
commencing upon full payment to Creditor of the Amended Down Payment Note.
(c)

Series A Preferred Shareholder will be entitled to accelerate the total

redemption obligation with respect to the Series A Preferred Stock upon lapse of thirty (30) days
after default by Company in payment when due of principal or interest on such obligation, unless
Company shall have cured such default within such 30-day period.
2.

Consent to Amended Down Payment Note, $6M Note and Security Therefor. Series

A Preferred Shareholder hereby consents to (i) Company's payment of its obligations to Creditor in
accordance with the terms of the Amended Dovm Payment Note and the Restructure Agreement; (ii)
Company's payment to Creditor of its obligations to Creditor in accordance with the terms of the
$6M Note, subject however to the subordination provisions of Section 3 hereof; (iii) the grant of
security interests in the Commission Collateral and Pledged Shares to secure payment of the two
notes; and (iv) the possible future pledge of bonds pursuant to Section 10 of the A.mended Stock
619
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P iedge Agreement and the release of security interest in part or all of the Pledged Shares and the
Commission Collateral.

3.

Subordination of Certain Principal Payments to Creditor. Payment of principal to

Creditor on the $6M Note (whether at maturity or at any earlier time in accordance with any right
of prepayment) shall be subordinated to payment in full of Company's obligation to redeem the Series
A Preferred Stock.

Company shall not pay any principal on the $6M Note until the Series A

Preferred Stock is completely redeemed (provided, however, that this limitation shall not preclude
Company from exercisir1g any contractual or equitable right of offset against the principal of the $6M
Note).
4.

Unconditional Release. Series A Preferred Shareholder releases Company and its

subsidiaries, their respective directors, officers, shareholders, employees, affiliates and other agents

in their offkial capacities, from all claims arising prior to the date hereof including, without limitation:
the assertion of purported dissenter's rights in connection with certain
transactions between ULIC and The Centennial Life Insurance Company;
(ii)

all claims against Company which are the subject of the various pleadings filed

on behalf of Series A Preferred Shareholder in her divorce action against Creditor in Case No. 5108 7
filed in Nez Perce County, Idaho;
(iii)

any breach of Company's articles of incorporation or the terms or conditions

of any of the Letter Agreements;
(iv)

any and all claims arising in connection with the Restructure, including

(without limitation) any dissenter's rights in connection therewith; and
(v)

any acts or omissions by Company, its subsidiaries, affiliates, shareholders,

directors, officers, employees or other agents.
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5.

Agreement to Forbear. Notwithstanding the foregoing release, Series A Preferred

Shareholder's rights and protection under Company's articles of incorporation shall be preserved;
provided, however, that so long as Company has not failed to pay principal or interest for redemption
of the Series A Preferred Stock hereunder when due or within the thirty-day cure period provided
by Section l (c) hereof, Series A Preferred Shareholder agrees to forbear from alleging any default
under Company's articles of incorporation and further agrees to forbear from exercising or attempting
to exercise any remedy for such default, whether arising from the terms of the articles of
incorporation or under legal or equitable principles.
6.

Estoppel Certificate. Series A Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that, to date,

Company has (i) paid $384,010 of principal of its obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred ·Stock
and (ii) has redeemed 38,401 shares of the 200,000 shares of Series A Preferred Stock originally
issued to Series A Preferred Shareholder; and Series A Preferred Shareholder further acknowledges
. that (iii) the unpaid principal balance of Company's obligation to redeem the Series A Preferred Stock
is $1,615,990 and (iv) 161,599 shares of Series A Preferred Stock remain outstanding.

7.

Representations and Warranties. Series A Preferred Shareholder represents and

warrants to Company and to Creditor as follows:
(a)

Series A Preferred Shareholder owns beneficially and of record all of the

i

!:·

outstanding Series A Preferred Stock, free and clear of all pledges, liens, encumbrances, security

r-::-··

interests, equities, claims, options or other limitations on Series A Preferred Shareholder's ability to
transfer such shares to Company upon payment of the redemption price.

;

Series A Preferred

Shareholder has full right, title and interest in and to the Series A Preferred Stock, and the legal
capacity and authority to execute, deliver and perform this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement
and to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby and thereby.
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(b)

Company and Creditor have advised Series A Preferred Shareholder to consult

legal and other professional counsel in connection with this Agreement and the Restructure
Agreement and has had the opportunity to do so. Series A Preferred Shareholder has consulted such
attorneys, accountants, family members and other advisors as she has deemed necessary or desirable
to assist her in reviewing this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement and in determining whether
it is in her best interests to execute and deliver them. Series A Preferred Shareholder has read and
understands the terms and conditions of this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement, as well as
the Letter Agreements which ·are being superseded and replaced by this Agreement and the
Restructure Agreement. Series A Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that she has had no contact
with Company or any of its directors, officers, legal counsel or other agents concerning this
Agreement or the Restructure Agreement; that this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement have
been drafted by counsel for Company and reviewed by counsel for Creditor; and that neither
Company, Creditor nor their respective counsel have represented Series A Preferred Shareholder in
connection herewith or therewith. Series A Preferred Shareholder acknowledges that her execution
and delivery of this Agreement and the Restructure Agreement have not been obtained by fraud,
duress, undue influence, coercion, breach of fiduciary relationship or breach of relationship of
confidence and trust; and Series A Preferred Shareholder hereby indemnifies Company against any
and all claims that her execution and delivery of this Agreement or the Restructure Agreement-was

I ,.

obtained by any such means.
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8.

General Terms.

(a)

All capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings

assigned in the Restructure Agreement.
(b)

:

This Agreement supersedes any replaces the Letter Agreements in their

entirety. The Letter Agreements shall hereafter have no further force or effect.
(c)

All notices, requests, demands and other communications which are required

to be or may be given under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been duly
given when delivered in person or transmitted by telex, facsimile, cable or telegram, or by certified
or registered first class mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, to the respective parties as
follows:

Ifto Company, to:

AIA Services Corporation
P.O. Box 538
One Lewis Clark Plaza
Lewiston ID 83501
Attention: John Taylor

With a copy to:

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow &
McK.lveen, Chartered
P.O. Box 1368
Boise ID 83701-1368
Attention: Richard A. Riley

Ifto Creditor to:

Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box 1165
Lewiston ID 83501

With a copy to:

Cairncross & Hempelmann
70th Floor, Columbia Center
701 Fifth Avenue
Seattle WA 98104-7016
Attention: W. Frank Taylor

Ifto Series A Preferred
Shareholder, to:

Donna J. Taylor
c/o

--------623
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or to such other address as any party may have furnished to the others in writing in accordance
herewith, except that notices of change of address shall be effective only upon receipt. Company's
payments of its redemption obligation to Series A Preferred Shareholder shall be delivered to Series
A Preferred Shareholder at her notice address as provided above.
(d)

This Agreement and the other Restructure Agreement contain the complete

and final expression of the entire agreement of the parties concerning Company's redemption of the
Series A Preferred Stock. No provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived, or
supplemented, except by a writing signed by all parties to this Agreement.
(e)

This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the

laws of the State ofldaho, without giving effect to any provisions or principles regarding conflict of
laws.
(f)

Headings used herein are for convenience only and shall not in any way affect

the construction of, or be taken into consideration in interpreting, this Agreement.
(g)

Each provision of this Agreement is interdependent with and inseparable from

every other provision hereof; and each covenant herein is given in consideration of every other
covenant herein. If any provision of this Agreement is invalid, illegal, unenforceable or inapplicable
to any person or circumstance to which it is intended to be applicable, in whole or in part, this entire
Agreement shall be void.
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EFFECTIVE as of the date first set forth above_
COI\1PANY:

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION

~; !lJ:!:: 7f
REED J. TAYLOR

CREDITOR:

_//

r:··

Rh//~--

/

SERIES A PREFERRED
SHAREHOLDER:

/

I

//

/

DONNA TAYLOR

;{{)~~
APPROVED:

By - - - - - - - - - - - - for Series A

Preferred Shareholder
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SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT

This Subordination Agreement ("Agreement'') is entered mto as of December 1, 2006, by
Taylor, o single perso1J t'Donna"} and Reed J. I aylor, a single person ·
("Reed''). Reed and Donna are bereinafte1 referred to individually as a "Party" and/ol' collectively
as the "Pe.rtie3_"
and between Donna l

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises contained in this
Agreement, the sufficiency of whjch is acknowledged as sufficient, fuJJ and complete
consideration for this Agreement, the Parties agree as follows:

I. Subordination. Donna agrees to uncomlitionaJly and irrevocably suboniinate all
amounts and obligations owed to her under the Series A Preferred Shm·eholder Agreement
between AJA Sen•ices Cotporatlon ("AJA Services"), Donna and Reed dated July 1, 1996
(including any modificotions thereto, if applicable) to be junior to all payments (including
principal and interest), obligations, rights and/or remedies owed to Reed by AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, Inc. ("AIA lnswancc'') and/01 any o!herperson or entity, The effect of this Agreement
shaJJ be to make all obligations and/or amounts owed to Donna Taylor by AIA Services
Corporation, AJA Insurance, R John Taylm and any other person or entity subordinate and
junior to all amounts and obligations owed to Reed by the foregoing persons and entities unde1
the agI"eements identified in Section 2 Reed shall be entitled to colJect aU amounts owed to him
before Donna's PrefeITed A Shares of AIA Services are ,~deemed or any further payments rue
made to Dorma. The effect of this Agreement shall be to permit Reed to collect, litigate, obtain
judgment, and/or enfon:e any and all rights and lemodies which relate in any way to the $6
Million Promisso1y Note, plus all accmed interest, costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees owed to
Reed through the various agreements set forth in Section 2 below. Thi!! Agreement may result in
Reed obtaining pa}'lllent, assets, and/ot· judgments which represent some or aU of the amounts
owed to him, while Donna's rights will be junior and inferior to Reed. Donna authorizes Reed to
provide copies of this Agreement to any pet-son, entity or cowt as Reed may unilaterally elect in
his sole ruscretion2. Ae:r-eements Affected by Donna's Subordination. Donna expressly subordinates all
amounts, rights, obligations, and remedies owed lo her in favo1 of (and junior to) Reed J I ayfor
tmder the folloVl.!ing agreements (including all claims, remedies, rights under such agrei,ments):
(a) $6 Million Promisso1y Note between Reed and AJA Services Corpo1ation ("AIA Services")
dated August l, 1995; (b) Stock Redemption Rcsttucture Agreement between Reed, Donna and
AIA Se1vic;es dated July Z, 1996; (c) Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement between
AIA Services and Reed dated July J, 1996; (d) Amended and Restated Security Agreement
between AJA Services, AlA Insurance, Jnc , and Reed dated July l, 1996; and (e) Letter between
Reed, R Jolm Tf!.ylox~ and Donna dated Februiuy 27, 2001; (f) Se.lies A Preferred Shareh0Ide1
Agreement between AIA Services, Donna and Reed dated July 1, 1996; end (g) any othe1

agi-eement, contmct or promise of any kind or nature.
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3. No Waiver of AIA Scrvlces Corporation 1s Defaults. The Parties acknowledge and
agree tha1 the execution of this Agreement shall not constitute either Party's waiver of AIA
Service's dofaults on paymentl3 due to Donna This Agreement simply subordinates all amounts
and obligations due to Donna uude1 the Sedes A Prefeued Shareholder Agreement in favm' of
amounts and obligations owed to Reed.

4. No Wniv<-r of Personnl Indebtedness. The Parties agree that this Agreement shall
not waive, modli)r 01 exting•iisb any personal indebtedness w.h.ich may be owed by R. John
Taylor or Connie Taylot to either Party for any debt, claim or cause of action.

5. Voluntary Execution. In executing this Agreement, the Parties acknowledge that
they have either consulted with an attorney prior to executing this Agreement or have elected to
ente1· into this Agrocmcnt withoul consulting an attorney. The Parties aclmowledge that they
have executed this Agreement only after careful independent investigation, voluntaiily and
without fraud, duress or undtie influence I'he Pa.rties expressly waive any and all defenses
which may bo later alleged or pled relati11g to lack of or failure of consideration. The Pa1ties
expressly agree that their mutual promises nre 11dcquato and more than sufficient considelfltion
for this Agreement.
6. Right, Powe~· 1md Aut!writy. The Parties wnnant to each other that they have the
right, power 11lld authority to execute and en(er into this Agreement. Donna represents that she
has not assigned her rights to any payments or othei rights In the Series A Preferred Shareholder
Agreement to any person 01· entity.

7. .EITe~t. This Agreement shall be birlding upon and inure to the benefit of each Pruty to
this Agc~ement, together with his/her agents, spouses, heirs, executors, admlnimators,
successors, and a1J persons uow or hereafter holding or having all or any part of the interest of a
Patty to this Agreement If My dispute, conflict, 01 question arises between the Parties regarding
o.ny lnte1pretatio11 of this Agn:emcnt and/oi- the law, the Patties agree that the terms, conditions,
and ob!igntions created undei this Agreement shall not be consoued and/or inte1preted agninst
the drafting party.

8. Applicable Lnw. The Parties agree that this Agreement sho.!1 be inte1preted under the
laws of the State ofidllho and venue of any dispute shall be in Nez Perce County, Idaho.
9. Countorpiu·t~ and Facslndlo or Scanned Tr!n11mlssfon. This Agreement may be
executed in counte1parts, each of which shell! be deemed an original insttument. Facsimile or
scanned trn.nsmissions of any signed original document, or transmission of any signed facsimile
or scanned document, shall be the same ns. delivo1y of an executed odginal. At the 1equest of an_y
of a Party, the Parties shnll c-onfinn facsimile transmission signatures by sigriing and delivering
an original document. The Partie~ may execule duplicate originals of the Agreement.

10. Asslgnn1ent, Reed may assign this Agreement and/or any rights under this Agreement
without Donna's consent.
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11. Furthe:r Assurance§. Donnn and Reed agree to cxeoute any iu,d all further documents,
pleadings-, agreements nnd the like necessary to carry out the terms and intent ofthis A~emc:int.
The Parties hereby execute this Agreement ns of the date indicated nbove_

DonnaJ. Ta
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SE OND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR HE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

DONNA J. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
V.

R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR,

Defendants.
and
DONNA J. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV08-01150 and
CV13-01075 (Consolidated cases)
OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT;
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE,
MOTION TO DISMISS, AND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)

)
V.

AJA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR; CONNIE
TAYLOR HENDERSON; JAMES BECK;
and MICHAEL CASHMAN, SR.,

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

---------------)

Taylo1· v. Taylor
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Tiris matter is before the Court onDefendants' .Motion to. Dismiss, Motion for Summ-ary ··
Judgment, Motion to Strike Portions of Peterson Declaration, and on Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral arguments on the Motions on May 23, 2014.
Plaintiff Donna Taylor was repre$ented by attorney Roderick C. Bond. Defendant AIA Ser:vices
Corporation was represented by attorney Douglas J. Siddoway. Defendants John Taylor, Connie
Taylor Henderson, James Beck, and Michael Cashman were represented by attorney David R.
Risley. The Court, having read the Motions, affidavits, and briefs filed by the parties, having
reviewed the record, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the
matter, hereby renders its decision.

BACKGROUND
This Court articulated the material facts in this matter in its Opinion and Order on
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment entered in July 26, 2013. For efficiency, the
Court will only repeat in part the facts as stated in that Order.

In 1995, a stock redemption agreement was entered into between AIA Services
Corporation («AIA"), shareholder Reed Taylor ("Reed"), who owned common shares, and
shareholder Donna Taylor ("Donna"), the sole owner of all outstanding Preferred A Shares
issued by the corporation 1• The corporation quickly found it was in default, however, and the
parties opted to enter into a new restructured agreement in 1996. 2 Under the 1996 Series A
Preferred Shareholder Agreement, AIA was to redeem Donna's shares over a ten year
amortization payment schedule. 3 The 1996 restructured agreement provided for Reed Taylor to

1 Donna Taylor became the owner of the Preferred A shares as part of a prope1ty settlement when, prior to 1995,

Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor divorced.
Exhibit A to the Complaint filed October 1, 2009.
3 Exhibit A to the Complaint filed October 1, 2009.

2

2
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receive certain payments over-the.same ten,year period with payment of a $6 million promissory . .
note at the end of the ten years. The restructured agreement further provided that the
corporation's debt to Donna was s"11ior to its debt to Reed. 4 In exchange for AIA's agreement to
accelerate .payment of the principal due o_n the redemptioµ_ ofthe Series A Pre_fe~r~d S~ares 1

. _ ...

Donna agreed to release AIA from any claims of breach or default relative to the 1995 Series A
Preferred stock redemption agreement. 5
AIA Services was incorporated in the mid 1980's and, since that time, John Taylor
("John") has held the position of president of the corporation. 6 Reed Taylor ("Reed") was the
founder and majority shareholder of AIA until 1995, when AIA agreed to redeem Reed's
common stocks. Upon the redemption of Reed's shares, John Taylor became the majority
shareholder. John Taylor continues to be the majority shareholder of AIA and continues to hold
the position of president of the corporation.
In a letter dated February 2001, John Taylor informed Donna that AIA was developing an
insurance program through a new company named CropUSA and requested AIA be allowed to
defer five months of stock redemption payments, with the understanding the amounts would be
paid at the end of contract. 7 Donna agreed to defer the payments based on the personal guarantee
of payment by John Taylor and Reed Taylor. 8
By 2006, AIA was in default of its 1996 stock redemption agreements with both Donna
Taylor and Reed Taylor. 9 In December 2006, Donna Taylor agreed to subordinate the amounts

Exhibit A to the Complaint filed October I, 2009.
Exhibit A to the Complaint filed October 1, 2009 at~ H.
6 Deposition of John Taylor, attached to the Affidavit of Michael S. Bissell filed October 1, 2009.
7 Exhibit C to Donna Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support filed October 1,
2009.
8 Exhibit 2 to the Affidavit of Connie Taylor filed October 15, 2009.
9 AJA entered into an agreement in 1996 to redeem Donna Taylor's Preferred A shares and with Reed Taylor to
redeem his common shares.
3
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·-- and obligations owecrto her::by AIA to those amounts and obligations owed to Reed Taylor by

~

AIA. Donna and Reed reduced their agreement to writing in a subordination agreement dated
December 1, 2006. 10 In January 2007, Reed Taylor filed suit against AIA and others, including

John Taylor and Connie Taylor, asse1iing numerous causes of action including br_each of .
contract. 11 That action was stayed pending appeal on the issue of whether the 1995 stock
redemption agreement between AIA and Reed Taylor and the 1996 restructured stock
redemption agreement were illegal contracts under the applicable statutory stock redemption
statute as it existed in 1995 and 1996.

On June 2, 2008, Plaintiff Donna Taylor filed the above-entitled action against Defendant
John Taylor. John Taylor timely filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial. On
October 27, 2008, by stipulation of the parties, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding as a
defendant Connie Taylor ("Connie"). 12 John Taylor timely filed an Answer to Amended
Complaint and Com1terclaim, as did Connie Taylor.
In October 2009, Plaintiff Donna Taylor filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Defendant John Taylor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant Connie Taylor
filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Court heard oral arguments on the Motions in November 2009.
The Court subsequently entered a stay in Donna Taylor's action after finding Donna's matters
shared common questions of law with Reed Taylor's action against the same Defendants and,
because the issues of law were on appeal, Donna's matter should be stayed pending a ruling on

the legal issues. In May 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court in Reed Taylor v. AJA Services
Exhibit 5 to the Affidavit of Connie Taylor filed October 15, 2009.
Reed Taylor v. AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman, JoLeeDuclos, Crop
USA Insurance, James Beck and Corrine Beck, Nez Perce County Case No. CV07-00208.
12 Connie Taylor was added as a defendant ~hen it was determined John Taylor and Connie Taylor continue to own
assets as community property. The marriage of John Taylor and Connie Taylor was terminated by an Interlocutory
Decree of Divorce in December 2005. However, the parties have not sought, nor has the court entered, a property
settlement dividing the community property that comprised the marital estate.
10
11

4
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Corporation, ·-151 Idaho353,261 P.3.d 829 (20H)-affomedthis Court's finding that the Stocke ·-.=-- Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable, having violated the earned and capital
surplus limitations in LC. § 30-1-6 as the statute existed in 1995 and 1996 .
.. Following entry of the Idaho SupremeCourt's ruling in Reed Taylor's cas_t;\I)efend_ants _
Taylor filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking to have the Court find as a matter
oflaw that the value of Donna Taylor's unredeemed stocks is $82,000.00, a value that was
disputed by Donna. The Court denied Defendant Taylors' Motion, lifted the stay, and informed
the parties that, should they desire, they could re-notice their 2009 motions and file additional
briefing.
In 2013, Donna Taylor filed a Complaint against AIA Services Corporation, R. John
Taylor, Connie Taylor Henderson, James W. Beck, and Michael W. Cashman, Sr. asse1iing
claims against AIA for breach of contract, against R. John Taylor, CoIU1ie Taylor Henderson,
James Beck, and Michael W. Cashman, Sr. claims for breach of fiduciary duties, aiding and
abetting fiduciary duties, and unjust enrichment, and as against all parties a cause of action
seeking declaratory relief/specific performance. The 2013 lawsuit (Nez Perce County Case No.
CV13-1075) and the 2008 lawsuit (Nez Perce County Case No. CV08-1150) were consolidated
by Order of the Court on August 7, 2013. Currently before the Court are motions re-filed by the
parties in the 2009 matter and the 2013 matter.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper if
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment should be granted if the evidence reveals no
5
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disputed issues-of material fact.. In making this determination; all disputed facts are liberally"- 0

construed in favor of the non-moving party. Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue
of material fact. De Groot v. Standley Trenching, Inc., 2014 WL 1266104 (2014). Inferences
that can reasonably be.made from the record are made in favor of the non-movjQg party.

Jd_ _

However, the non-moving party may not rest on a mere scintilla of evidence. If the record raises
neither a question of witness credibility nor requires weighing the evidence, then summary
judgment should be granted. Id The moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving
party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case. ParkWest Homes, LLCv. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678,682,302 P.3d 18, 22 (2013)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).

ANALYSIS
A. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PEDERSON DECLARATION
Defendants seek to have the Court strike portions ofthe declaration filed by Plaintiff's
expert, Paul Pederson. In particular, Defendants seek to strike Pederson's adoption and
incorporation of his affidavit filed in Reed Taylor's case, arguing it is not part of this record.
Defendants further assert portions of statements are conclusory, opinions of law, or based on
facts for which Pederson has no direct knowledge. The Court, without striking the declaration,
will determine what is relevant and proper and will consider only those statements that are
admissible expert statements.

B. DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for fraud, constructive fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants contend the tort
claims are barred by the economic loss rule. The Court agrees.
6
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--Idaho's Appellate Courts have consistently.held that, unless an exception-applic.s,-the , -:
economic loss rule precludes recovery of pureiy economic losses in negligence actions, stating
there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another. Stapleton v. Cushman Drilling and Pump

. _ Co., 153 ldaho 735, 7.42, 291 P.3d 418 (2014). '~[A]s a gener1:1I rule, aplail!tiffis prohibited fr.om.
recovery in tort for purely economic losses absent an accompanying physical injury to persons or
property, unique circumstances, or a special relationship. Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement

Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007-08, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200--01 (1995)." In the instant matter, Donna
Taylor's loss is purely economic. Therefore, her claims in tort will only survive if they fall
within one of the exceptions to the economic loss rule.
The first exception occurs when economic loss accompanies, or is parasitic to, physical
injury to persons or prope1iy. This exception is clearly not applicable to the instant matter, as
Donna Taylor asserts no injury to her person or property. The second exception occurs when
unique circumstances require re-allocation of the risks. Donna Taylor has presented the Court
with no facts that would place her economic loss into this second exception. The third exception
occurs when there is a special relationship between the pruiies. Defendants contend the
relationship of shareholder with the corporation or its corporate officers is not a special
relationship as defined by Idaho case law. Plaintiff counters by arguing the economic loss rule
bars only tort claims for negligent acts or omissions, not intentional torts as asserted by Donna.
Addressing the type of special relationship that must exist to trigger the third exception to the
economic loss rule, Idaho's Appellate Comis have stated,
The 'special relationship' exception generally pertains to claims for personal
services provided by professionals, such as physicians, attorneys, architects,
engineers and insurance agents. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 408, 848 P.2d
984, 992 (Ct.App.1992). A special relationship may exist where a party holds
itself out to the public as performing a specialized function and induces reliance
on superior knowledge and skill. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
7
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In Duffin, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a special relationship existed
betv1reen an entity wltieh ce!iitied seed potatoes and a fam1cr who bought seed
which was certified but defective. The seed ce:tification entity was the only such
entity in the state. The entity held itself out to rhe public as having expertise in
seed certific~tion and induced reliam.:e on that expertise. Furthermore, the farn1er
was_ gbHgated to utilize the entity. Due to this specialization and induced reliance
o-n tile ~eed certification entity's expertise, the Supreme Comt gave the fanner the
ability to recover for pure economic loss based upon a special relationship.
However, the Supreme Court explained in its holding that this princ.ipie only
applies to an "extremely limited group of cases"· in which it is equitable to
impose a duty to exercise due care to avoid the pure economic loss of another.
Id. at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201.
Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 710, 99 P.2d 1092 (Ct.App.2004).

The issue of whether the economic loss rn1e bars inientional torts where damage3 are
purely economic has not been addressed by Idaho's Appellate Courts. Other jurisdictions have,

however, addri:ssed the issue.
Recognizing the shortcomings of the economic loss rnle, the Eastwood court held
that the more appropriate inquiry when cieterrnining if tort remedies are.
recoverable \;'\rhen a contracmal relati,mshi_p also exists is whether an independent
legal duty exists, outside the pa. :ties' contractual relationship, imposing a duty on
1:hetmifeasor.170 Wash.2dat389,241 P.3d 1256. Thus, thecoU11held, "An
injury is remediable in tort if it traces back to the breach of a tort duty arising
independently of the term., of the contraet." Dle court named this inquiry the
«independent duty doctrine.') Eastwood, 170 Wash.2d at 398,241 P.3d 1256.
1

Although it reframed the app,:opriate inquiry and renamed the rule, the court
noted that when determining hov,; a court can distinguish between claims where a
plaintiff is limited to contract remedies and cases when'! recovery in tort may be
available[, a] review of our cases, on tb.e ~ccnomic loss rule shews that ordinary
tort p1inciples have always resolved this questi011 .... The court determines whether
there is an independent tort duty of care, and "[t]he existence of a duty is a
question cf lavv' and depends on mixed considerations of logic, common sense,
justice, policy, and precedent." Evslvt·'0£1'7; 170 Wash.2d at 389, 24.1 P:3d 1256
(internal quotation marks omitted) (third alteration in original) (quoting Snyder v.
Med Serv. Corp. o.f E. Wash., 145 Wash.2cl 233,243, 35 P.3d 1158 (2001)).

Hendrickson v. Tender Care Animal Hosp. Corp., 312 P.3d 52,58 1 i 76 Wash.App. 757, 768
(Wash.Ct.App.2013).
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InMcCann v. Mccann, 152 Idaho 809,815,275 P.3d 824,829 (2012), the Supreme
Court reiterated the legal standard that a corporation and its directors owe fiduciary duties to
shareholders. "This Court held that in a closely-held corporation, the corporate directors owe a
fiduciary duty to one another, to the corporation and to the shareholders, including the minority
shareholders." McCann, 152 Idaho at 815. Dom1a Taylor, as a shareholder, was owed fiduciary
duties by the Defendant corporate directors, duties that are independent of any contractual duties
she was owed. However, Idaho's Appellate Courts have not extended the definition of 'special
relationships' beyond those relationships involving personal services provided by professionals
who hold themselves out to the public as performing specialized functions. Any expansion of
the definition must be left to Idaho's Appellate Courts. Therefore, the Court does not find the
relationship between Plaintiff Donna Taylor and the Defendants to be one for personal services
performed by professionals. As a result, Donna's claims for fraud, constructive fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, do not fall within the third
exception to the economic loss rule.
The Cowi finds none of the exceptions to the economic loss rule applicable to Plaintiff
Donna Taylor's claims for fraud, constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, or aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, because Donna's claims are for purely economic
loss, the economic loss rule bars her claims in tort as a matter of law.

(C) PLAINTIFF'S UNnJST ENRICHMENT CLAIM
Plaintiff Donna Taylor asserts in her Second Amended Complaint filed November 6,
2009 and in her 2013 Complaint, that the named individual Defendants were unjustly enriched
when, after obtaining her approval in 2001 to defer her stock redemption payments for five
months, Defendants transferred substantial amounts of AIA 's assets to CropUSA, Defendants
9
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looted AIA to their benefit, Defendants then informed Donna AIA had insufficient-funds to
continue making the promised redemption payments, and by their conduct Defendants have been
unjustly enriched to the detriment of Donna Taylor. Defendants contend Donna has failed to
make out a prima facie case for unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment occurs when a defendant receives a benefit that would be inequitable
to retain without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust. Beco Const,·.

Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). In order to set out a
prima facie case for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must present facts on three elements: (1) there
was a benefit confensed upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of
such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for
the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof.

Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999).
"However, the alleged recipient must also be the intended beneficiary. Hettinga v. Sybrandy,
126 Idaho 467,471, 886 P.2d 772, 776 (1994). Accordingly, '[r]ecovery for unjust emichment
is unavailable if the benefits [to the recipient] were created incidentally by [the claimant] in
pursuit of his own financial advantage.' Id." Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 897, 277 P.3d
337 (2012). The party who has conferred the benefit and who is seeking the return of the full
amount thereof has the burden of proving it would be unjust for the recipient to retain any part of
the benefit. Toews v. Funk, 129 Idaho 316,323,924 P.2d 217,224 (Ct.App.1994).
Donna Taylor, by agreeing to allow AJA to defer five months of stock redemption
payments in order to allow AIA to develop CropUSA, conferred a benefit on .A.IA, not on the
named individual Defendants, nor is there any evidence Donna intended the individual
Defendants to benefit. Any benefit enjoyed by the individual Defendants was incidentally
10
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Grcated· asa·result of-Donna's pursuit of.her own financial advantage.. Therefpr<;:,J.:ecovery .for ..
unjust emichment against the individual Defendant's in unavailable to Donna. Rather, recovery
is available through breach of contract claims against AIA, and against John Taylor and Reed
Taylor as guarantors.

(D) DONNA'S CLAIM UNDER THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT
In February 2001, Donna Taylor received a letter signed by John Taylor and Reed Taylor
seeking to defer payment on Donna's stock redemption for five months in order to facilitate the
startup of CropUSA. 13 The letter ends with, "Reed and John will guarantee the deferred
payments." Donna subsequently agreed to defer redemption payments for five months.
However, in breach of the agreement between the parties, the defeLTed payments have never been
made to Donna, who now seeks to recover the five defetTed payments plus interest from John
Taylor only. Defendants contend Reed Taylor is an indispensable pruty and must be joined by
Donna or, in the alternative, the Court should find Donna relieved Reed of his guaranty
obligation, thus rendering John Taylor's guaranty void.
Rule 19(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedmes reads:
Persons to Be Joined ifFeasible. A person who is subject to service of process
shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition
of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede
the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not
been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party If the person
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a
defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.

Exhibit C to Donna Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof, filed
October 1, 2009.
11
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John Taylor and Reed Taylor became co-guarantors under the terms of the deferred
payment agreement. Donna Taylor, as the creditor, may seek recovery from either or both
guarantors. However, if one guarantor pays more than his equal share of the debt, recover-y-for
payment of more than his propositional share may be sought from the other guarantor.

If a principal obligation is guaranteed by two or more persons, each must pay the
proportional share of the liability, and a guarantor who has paid more than his or
her share is entitled to contribution from the others and may sue to enforce that
right. While an action for contribution may not be maintained unless the guarantor
has paid more than his or her share of the obligation, or satisfied a judgment
against that guarantor, it is not necessary that the guarantor have paid the entire
debt. A guarantor may be entitled to interest on the contribution due, payable
from the date of payment by the guarantor.
The right to contribution among coguarantors arises from their implicit agreement
that each would contribute his or her just proportion of any liability and, thus, is
based on an implied contract. That right is governed by equitable principles and is
subject to equitable defenses.
A guarantor is entitled to contribution regardless of whether the guarantors signed
a single or separate documents, or the creditor released the co guarantors after the
default on the underlying loan.
38 Am.Jur.2d Guaranty§ 100.
The Court found no Idaho case law instructive on this issue. However, the Court rejects
Donna's argument that Reed was somehow relieved of his liability as co-guarantor. Reed Taylor
signed the letter that create the guaranty and has offered no evidence to the contrary. The Court
also rejects John Taylor's theory that Donna Taylor, by executing a subordination agreement
with Reed Taylor in 2006, relieved Reed of his obligation under the guaranty without John
Taylor's consent, and as a result John Taylor is relieved of his obligation. Defendant offers the
Court no legal authority in support of his theory, nor has the Court found any such authority.
The Court finds the 2001 guaranty event and the 2006 subordination agreement event to be two
12
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distinct and unrelated events that have no effeet on -the other,-- .Bas~d on the general principals of.
guaranty law and I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), the Court finds Reed Taylor is not an indispensable party, as
Donna Taylor may obtain complete relief from only one of the guarantors. If full recovery is
obtained from John Taylor, he may theJ.?:bring.:an action ag~nst Reed_'[a)'lor, as the CQ:
guarantor, to recover Reed's portion of the liability.
(E) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants contend the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement was illegal, thus
making void any obligation to redeem Donna's shares. Plaintiff Donna Taylor argues that, even
if the 1995 and 1996 redemption agreements are void, there was a prior lawful agreement
between Donna and AIA regarding redemption of her Series A shares, that agreement was
memorialized in three letters that preceded the 1995 and 1996 agreements, and the 'letter'
agreement is enforceable, as it could not be superseded by an illegal agreement. Defendants
contend the 1995 redemption agreement evidenced by the letters cannot be resun-ected by the
Court, as the intent of the parties in entering the 1995 and 1996 agreements would be thwarted
and Donna Taylor would be allowed to receive the benefit of a higher interest rate and
amo11ization schedule.

In the instant matter, the parties agree the 1995 and 1996 Series A Shareholder
Agreements between Donna Taylor and AIA are illegal for the same reasons Reed Taylor's
Promissory Note for redemption of his shares was illegal. 14 The parties also agree there was an
earlier 1995 agreement memorialized in three letters 15 that lawfully provided for the redemption
of Donna Taylor's Series A shares. However, while Donna Taylor argues the 'letters' agreement
is enforceable, Defendants argue it was superseded by the illegal agreements and, if enforced
14

See Taylor v. AJA, 151 Idaho 552,261 PJd 829 (2011).

15

See Exhibits C, D, and E to the Affidavit of Donna Taylor filed May 23, 2013.
13
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· .·· -novr,-wouJd be contrary to the intent of ·the p·m1ii3s, 1995, arid:199-6 agteements, would-reward- --· - -

Dom1a for her 'misconduct' 16, and would give Donna the benefit of a higher interest rate and
amortization schedule.
The Court, while unable tQ find-any instructiveldaho case law, finds the majority_ of
jurisdictions adhere to the rule that a legal and valid contract is not made void by a subsequent
illegal contract regarding the same subject matter.
A subsequent illegal agreement by the parties cannot affect a previous fair and
lawful contract between them in relation to the same subject. The change is
regarded as a mere nullity, and as such cannot scathe the original contract.
Wilcoxon v. Logan, 91 N.C. 449; Britt v. Aylett, 11 Ark. 475, 52 Am.Dec. 282;
McCurdy v. Dillon, 135 Mich. 678, 98 N.W. 746; Cain v. Bom1er, 108 Tex. 399,
194 S.W. 1098, 3 A.L.R. 874; 15 A. & E.Ency.Law 932; Tearney v. Maimiom,
103 W.Va. 394, 137 S.E. 543; 17 C.J.S., Contracts, s 287; Page on Contracts, sec.
2469. See also: In re Port Publishing Co., 231 N.C. 395, 57 S.E.2d 366, 14
A.L.R.2d 842.

Tillman v. Talbert, 93 S.E.2d 101,103,244 N.C. 270,272 (N.C.1956).
The Cami finds the "no taint" holding by other jurisdictions persuasive. The Comi also
agrees that under Idaho law, "If a contract is illegal and void, the court will leave the parties as it
finds them and refuse to enforce the contract." Wernecke v. St. ~Maries Joint School Dist. # 401,
147 Idaho 277,287,207 P.3d 1008, 1018 (2009). Where the Court finds the parties in the instant
matter is in the position they were just prior to the illegal agreements being entered into. The
parties do not dispute that, prior to entering into the illegal agreements, the parties entered into an
agreement with Donna Taylor for the redemption of her Series A shares, and that the agreement
was memorialized in a series of three letters, with two of the letters being signed by the
necessary parties. That agreement was a lawful and enforceable agreement establishing the
16 Defendants argue Donna Taylor committed 'misconduct' in 2006 when she entered into a subordination
agreement with Reed Taylor giving Reed priority over Donna relative to redemption payments. lt was within
Donna's right to relinquish priority and to do so without the consent of AIA, who neither benefitted nor was hanned
by the payment priority issue.

14
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-- temrn forredemption of Donna Taylor' s-Series-A:-shares, and, therefore, the Court finds -the.
'letters' agreement remains valid, enforceable, and unscathed by the subsequent illegal
agreements. Contrary to the arguments put forth by the Defendants, AIA's amended articles are
not applicable to redemption ofDonna'sSeriesAshares,astheamendments becc1me yffo_c_:tiye.
well after AIA entered into the 'letters' agreement with Donna. Redemption of Donna's share
must be in conformance with the lawful and enforceable 'letters' agreement.
(F) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the following issues: (a) the 1995 'letters'
agreement is legal and enforceable; (b) 41,509.69 of Donna Taylor's Series A shares have yet to
be redeemed; (c) Donna Taylor is owed $415,096.86 for unredeemed Series A shares plus
accrued interest; (d) the controlling shareholders breached fiduciary duties to Donna Taylor; and
(e) dismissal of AIA's counterclaim asserting Donna Taylor breached the 1995 and 1996 Series
A shareholder agreement. The Court, in addressing the Motions of the Defendants, has already
dete1mined the 1995 'letters' agreement is legal and enforceable. Therefore, the Court will not
re-address that issue. In regard to the number of Series A shares that are outstanding and the
value of those shares, the Court has already determined the shares must be redeemed in
conformance with the 1995 'letters' agreement. In addition, the Court finds the number of
unredeemed shares still held by Donna Taylor is the amount shown by AIA's records on the date
of the la<it payment made to Donna Taylor.
Next, the Court finds summary judgment on the issue of whether the majority
shareholders breached fiduciary duties to Donna Taylor as a minority shareholder must be
denied. Defendants have consistently maintained the legality of the business dealings involving
AIA, CropUSA, and other entities. The parties dispute nearly every fact asserted by the other on
15
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-this issue; leaving the CoU1t witlfgenuincnss-ues ofmater:i:al fachn dispute that preventa·grnnt of -·
summary judgment.
Lastly, the Court finds there can be no breach of the 1995 and 1996 Series A Shareholder
Agreements by Donna Taylor, as one cannot breach.an-illegal agreement. Defendants have

.

..

asserted the illegality of those Agreements throughout this proceeding and Idaho's Supreme
Court held the Agreements illegal in Taylor v. AJA, I 51 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011). Therefore,
Domia Taylor cannot be held to have breached an illegal agreement by entering into a
subordination agreement with Reed Taylor. In addition, the Court finds no breach of the 1995
'letters' agreement based on the subordination agreement between Donna Taylor and Reed
Taylor. The only beneficiary to the priority of payment was Donna Taylor and, as the only
beneficiary, it was her right to waive and to do so without legal obligation to first obtain the
consent of AIA.
(G) COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
Both parties seeks costs and attorney fees based on LC.§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).
The Court denies an award of costs and attorney fees to either party, as the Court finds there is
no prevailing party and that none of the motions were brought, pursued, or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation.

ORDER
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part.
Defendants' Motion to Strike is hereby DENIED.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED only as to Plaintiffs
claim for unjust enrichment. Defendants' Motion is DENIED as to all other issues.
16
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·. Defendants' Motion t0;Disriiiss-is hereby.GRANTED as to PlaintiWs claims for fraud,
constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty.

·

•

•

•

-

0

Dated.this _/ { . day. of July 2014.

~

------
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cumer L- Graen, Esq.
Green Law Offioes
P.O. Box 2597

Boise, ID

Re:

82701

AIA services Corporation/Donna Taylor

Dear Cumer:
,,,

This letter memorial:izes our agreement concerning Bonn-a J.
'raylor 1 s interest in AIA s~rvices Corporation as tha holder of its
stated Value Preferred stock and in the pending reorganization of
thte company, including the contribution . of additional capital
th.rough a private placement to be conducted by J.G. Kinnard and
Company, :Incorporated.
1,
1.
Effective February 1, ·1995r regardless of thQ outcome of
the priv-ate placement, tne monthly preferred stock redemption
payments shall be converi:,Qd from a fi:fteen year amortization at
prime rate less. 1-1/2% to a ten-year payout at prime rate plus
1/4%, to confom with the terms of t.ha anticipated nota payment to
Reed·J. Taylor for redempt.ion -of his common stock. In addition,
your client will be en-t;itled to accelerate the redemption
obligation upon lapse of f~fte,m days after default in payment of
the 'prinoipil'll or iterest. ,,
.
Further, AIA Services" Corporation 1 s note or any note payable
to Reed J. Taylor tor the $6,000,000 purchase price tor hi•.· common
ehares will be subordinated to the redemption rights qf ye;,~· client
so that R$ed J. ~aylo.r wi11 reoe~ve no p.rineip.al payment, on sai~
note until Donna Tay;L.cr I s s~oc:k has been c:ompletely ~edeemed. ~ssd

i

I

!

J. Taylor will rece.ive no interest payia.ents on the. note payable to
him if payments to Donna Taylor are in default. ShoUld Reed J.
1'aylor transfer his remaining 113,494 shares of ~tA Services common
stcok to the Co:,:poration, directly or indirectly or eftecuate a
reduction or el.iJnination of his note in somQ othQr farahion, Donna
cra:ylo:r: • s re4emption obligation shall become due and fUlly payable.

RJT~D39~·b·t
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2.
In the interim prior to closing of tha private placement, all
of your client's existing claims are preserved and discovery may
oontinue. ArA Services ag~ees to cooperate w.ith you in setting a
hearing, if the offering i~ ttnsuceessful, within .sixty days after
termination of tha offering.

3.
.If the private placement is successful, AJ:A Sc.rvicea will pay
to Donna. Taylor a lump su,m red.emption payment of $700, ooo plus
$100,000 for professional fees inourrad by your client in pursuing
her claims to date.
In 1addition, to the extent the o~tering
proceeds exceed the minimUlU offering level o! $5,350 1 000, AIA
Services will pay your client each dollar of net offering proceeds
in excess of the minimUltl up to the full amount of the unpaid
principal balance of the redel!lption price.
If thQ offering
p~oceeds exciead the minimum but do not reach thG

maximum,

any

unpaid principal balance of the redemption price will be paid in
monthly installments based upon the ten-year amortization at prillle
plus 1/4%.
~1

Conditioned upon the ;'successful completion of the private
plaeel'lfent and your client ts receipt of the foregoing paj'ltaents,
Donna Taylor releas(;!s A'IA Services Corporation and it subsidiaries,
their respect.ive officers; directors, shareholders, employees,
affiliates and. other agents:. in their official c,apacitieef1i:Wfrom/~ll
4.

,,,tlflfl1I1!!il!IJ1iltli
does not release Reed. Tayl<?r fndividuallY :from hi&i" obligation to
Donna Taylor arising from .·said divorce action.
Further, Donna
Taylor's :rights and proteci;ions as a preferred shareholde.r which
are sat forth in the Amen4~d Articles of Incorporation shall be
preserve(l.
In addition, $ubject to the same conditionst Donna
Taylor consents to I and agre.es that she will not aasert disc.enter' a
rights in connection with ~i1 corporate transactions necessary to
effectuate the private placement, including (without li1dta.tion)
al!lendment . of the corporation's Articles of :tncorporatl<>n to
authorize tbe creation of the necessary preferred stock and
warrants; the issuance of such securities to the private .plao~ment
investors, the Agency Agreement with J. G. ~innard and Company,
Incorpora.ted and the conduct of the p~iva~e placement in accordance
therewith, the U5e of the proposed Confid,ntial :Private Placement
Memorandum representing ~at your client has consented to .all such
trans.actions, the mezver of :Rich Campanaro •·s Delaware. corporation
into AU services corporat~o~ and all other actions necessary to

achieve the capital s~ct~e .(as of the closing of the private
placement) refl.eoted ~n ~' Private Plao~ant Memorandum. suoh
corporate transactions will not be allowed to l)ecome eftec::tive
unless th~. offering is succe$sful; and therefore, your client sha·ll
'

·
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r.,:;;t:. '1nive a.nr right• ot ~• p.r~j\\~ioc:w. by h-c.r t1on~ont to, ~nd wA:1.Vur

of di~a6ntA~'• r1g~tG in CQnnQction vith thQae t~anaaat.ions.

tt the ccrpo~ation QQmpl~t•ll redeem• yQu~ olie~t'• pr~f•rred

~ock, ocnna ~~y~or complct9ly relaa~ea AJ:A services c~~oration
t1.nd $.:ta c.ull•idi«:c-ie~, th.Gil:- .rupeotiv• effioers1 dit'&otora,.
~har~hol~ars, ~loy&es, ~tfiliatas ffn~ O'thQ~ &g~ttta, and ~e~d J,
~~y1or ~a 4n it~ivid\U.l; trom &ll claim,,
!t~ thl~ l.e&ttcir 1.ocm.~~-\:Qly 1tatias -cur t\greem'1rtt, ~l.~so eign
and obtain ycu: cl1ont 1~ si;nttura bsl~~ and fa~ e copy ct this
:fUJ..1.t axtdtit•d lo.ttor to u.e: e.e •oon aa ~01111ibla. :tb11:l.• Darlin and
yot:1, wil1 JUUtU.&lly p~tpare a draft 'ct a do.t~itiva &1att.l.eine.nt
aqraam«nt i~~orpor«tihg ths to~egoi~g tarma ~nd ~ther dooument•
neQta•a.ry to etiaotu.t, th~
1gr•~~~nt,
. t•t,i:1Q ot. ~ia
"
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
DONNA J. TAYLOR,

Case No.:
Plaintiff,

CV13 Q1 0 / 5

COMPLAINT
Category: A
Fee: $96.00

v.
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; R. JOHN TA \'LOR; CONNIE
TAYLOR HENDERSON; JAMES BECK;
and MICHAEL W. CASHMAN, SR.,

,JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendants.

Plaintiff Donna J. Taylor, by and through her attorney of record, submits this Complaint
alleging and, to the extent necessary, pleading in the alternative as follows:

I.
1.

PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
.

'

Plaintiff Donna J. Taylor ("Donna Taylor") is a resident of Clarkston, Asotin

County, Washington.
I

2.

Defendant AIA Services Corporation (AIA Services Corporation, together with its

past and present subsidiaries are collectively referred to as "AIA Services") is an Idaho
corporation with its principal offices located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho.
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3.

_ _I

Defendant R. John Taylor ("John Taylor") is an individual residing in Lewiston,

Nez Perce County, Idaho. John Taylor has been a member of the board of directors of AIA
Services since it was founded.
4.

Defendant Connie Taylor Henderson ("Connie Taylor") is an individual residing

in the state of Washington.
5.

Defendant James Beck ("Beck") is an individual residing m the state of

Minnesota, who transacts business in Idaho.
6.

Defendant Michael W. Cashman, Sr. ("Cashman") is an individual residing in the

state of Minnesota, who transacts business in Idaho.
7.

Cashman, Beck, Connie Taylor and John Taylor are collectively referred to in this

Complaint as the "individual defendants". When Donna Taylor refers to the foregoing
"individual defendants" in this Complaint, she is alleging that more than two or more or all of the
i

"individual defendants".
8.

Damages in this action exceed $10,000 and the defendants conduct business

and/or reside in Nez Perce County, Idaho. Jurisdiction and venue are appropriate in Nez Perce
County District Court. See e.g., LC.§ 5-404; LC. §5-514.
9.

This is not a derivative action and Donna Taylor will not be asserting any

derivative claims in this lawsuit. 1 Donna Taylor is asserting the direct claims and requested relief
in this lawsuit strictly for her own personal benefit, as the Series A Preferred Shareholder of AIA
Services. To the extent that Donna Taylor _is successful in obtaining personal liability from the

1 Donna Taylor has a pending derivative lawsuit in United States District Court in Idaho under Case No.
1: 1O-cv-00404-MLB. Although she will continue to attempt pursue derivative claims in that lawsuit, the case has
been presently stayed pending the resolution of Taylor v. Riley, et al., a wholly unrelated case wherein Reed Taylor
is pursuing negligence based claims against the authors of an opinion letter given to 'Reed Taylor in connection with
the illegal purchase of his shares in AIA Services. See Taylor v. Riley, 2012 WL 7985412. That lawsuit will not
resolve any of the claims or issues subject to this lawsuit nor will it recovery any money for AIA Services or its
minatory shareholders.
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individual defendants in this lawsuit, she will be benefiting the innocent minority shareholders of
AIA Services and participants of the AIA Services 40l(k) Plan-all of whom have been cheated
out of their fair share of the corporate assets, opportunities and funds by and through the
defendants' acts and omissions.
10.

AIA Services, by and through the individual defendants, initiated a lawsuit

against Donna Taylor and thirteen other shareholders of AIA Services in Nez Perce County
District Court under Case No. CV-12-01483. Judge Kerrick dismissed that lawsuit wherein he
ruled that the fourteen shareholders of AIA Services had complied with Idaho Code when they
objected to the reverse stock split sought by AIA Services (which was really sought, upon
information and belief, by and through the individual defendants). Judge Kerrick ruled that
issues pertaining to the amount owed to Donna Taylor for her Series A Preferred Shares should
I

I

be determined in the case Donna Taylor v. John Taylor, et al., Nez Perce County District Court
Case No. CV-08-01150.
11.

Based upon Judge Kerrick's order granting summary judgment to the defendants

in CV-12-01483 (one of whom was Donna Taylor), Donna Taylor will move to consolidate this
lawsuit with Nez Perce County District Court Case No. CV-08-01150 (AIA Services, Beck and
Cashman are not parties to that lawsuit).

IT. FACTUALBACKGROUND
A. Background On Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares.

12.

On December 14, 1987, Reed and Donna Taylor executed the Property Settlement
I:

Agreement for their divorce. Under the terms of that Agreement, Reed and Donna Taylor
contributed their controlling interest in AIA Insurance, Inc. and other entities to AIA Services in
exchange for 200,000 Series A Preferred Shares and 5,963 additional common shares in AIA

COMPLAINT - 3

13

Services. Under the terms of Reed and Donna Taylor's Property Settlement Agreement, the
200,000 Series A Preferred Shares were transferred to Donna Taylor.
13.

On December 29, 1987, AIA Services' Amended Articles oflncorporation were

filed with the Idaho Secretary of State to protect the rights and interests of the Series A Preferred
Shareholders (which was and only has been Donna Taylor) and to impose restrictions upon AIA
Services.
14.

On December 2, 1993, Donna Taylor exercised her right to require her Series A

Preferred Shares to be purchased; however, AIA Services elected to purchase her shares at the
price of $10 per share over 15 years with interest to accrue at the prime rate minus one and onehalf percent (1.5%).
15.

On January 11, 1995, AIA Services agreed to accelerate the purchase of Donna

Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares by purchasing them over 10 years, with an upward
adjustment to the interest rate of prime interest rate plus one-quarter percent (prime plus .25%).
That Agreement was authorized by, and AIA Services was authorized to use capital surplus to
purchase Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares as provided in LC. § 30-1-6, AIA Services
Amended Articles of Incorporation.
!

16.

On March 22, 1995, Cumer Green, on behalf of Donna Taylor, and Richard Riley,

on behalf of AIA Services, confirmed that Donna Taylor's shares would be redeemed on that
ten-year amortization schedule, or 107 more payments commencing on February 1, 1995. This
confirmed that under the terms of the January 11, 1995 Agreement Donna Taylor's Series A
Preferred Shares were required to be purchased no later than on or before December 1, 2003.

17.

On July 18, 1995 and August 10, 1995, respectively, AIA Services and Donna

Taylor agreed to other modified terms, although none of the modifications changed the ten-year
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amortization period or interest rate agreed to in the January 11, 1995 Agreement.
18.

1.~.

Almost one year later, on July 1, 1996, Donna Taylor and AIA Services executed

the Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement. The Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement
was drafted by AIA Services' counsel. Donna Taylor was not represented by counsel at that
time. Under the terms of that Agreement, AIA Services confirmed that it would continue to
purchase Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares in accordance with the January 11, 1995
Agreement and AIA Services further agreed to accelerate payments to Donna Taylor through the
Series A Preferred Shareholder Agreement by paying her an additional $100,000 every six
months after Reed Taylor's $1.5 million down payment note was paid (which was paid in full in
2001), but she never received a single additional $100,000 payment as required.
19.

On February 21, 2008, John Taylor testified that Donna Taylor was owed

$443,478.47 in principal on her Series A Preferred Shares. On June 24, 2008, John Taylor wrote
to Donna Taylor advising her that payments would be suspended to her. John Taylor admitted
that the payments were suspended in retaliation for her filing a lawsuit against him for a personal
guarantee ofover $100,000 of the sums owed to her.
20.

Despite Donna Taylor allowing AIA Services, John Taylor and Connie Taylor

almost five years to pay her since the last payment, Donna Taylor has not received a payment
since May 30, 2008. On February 11, 2013, Donna Taylor wrote to AIA Services demanding
payment in full, providing notice of acceleration and advising that she would not consent to the
purchase of any common shares. Donna Taylor received no response to that letter and no
payments were made by AIA Services.

21.

The amount due to her as of June 6, 2013 is at least $492,346.54. The amount

owed is governed by and confirmed through the unambiguous Series A Preferred Shareholder
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Agreement, and, to the extent that Agreement is successfully challenged, Donna Taylor's
contractual rights revert back to previously executed Agreements, including the January 11, 1995
Agreement.
22.

AIA Services and the individual defendants are expected to assert that the

Agreements that they engineered and approved requiring the purchase of Donna Taylor's shares
were illegal because the purchase of Reed Taylor's shares was illegal (the purchase that the
individual defendants engineered and effectuated through AIA Services) and that Donna
Taylor's rights revert back to the Amended Articles of Incorporation. Under this theory, AIA
Services has already asserted that Donna Taylor is owed at least approximately $82,000. Thus,
there is no dispute that Donna Taylor is owed a significant sum of money under any theory.
23.

Despite numerous demands for payment, AIA Services and the individual

defendants have refused to pay her the sums owed to purchase her remaining Series A Shares as
required.
24.

Despite having not paid Donna Taylor, AIA Services and the individual

defendants have conspired to transfer millions of dollars from AIA Services for their benefit. For
example, in recent years AIA Services has loaned Pacific Empire Radio Corporation (an entity
partially owned and controlled by John Taylor and Connie Taylor) over $700,000 when such
loans were barred by AIA Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation and engaged in other
acts discussed below.
25.

AIA Services and the individual defendants have intentionally and blatantly

refused to complete the purchase of Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares as required. AIA
Services and the individual defendants have intentionally and blatantly acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, maliciously, and in complete disregard for Donna Taylor's contractual rights and the
i''

I

COMPLAINT - 6

16

I,
I

i

.----,,

provisions under AIA Services' Articles oflncorporation which were enacted to protect her.
B. Background On the Operation of AIA Services and Unlawful Acts.

26.

From 1995 through the present time, John Taylor and Connie Taylor were

majority shareholders of AIA Services' common shares.
27.

From 1995 through the present time, John Taylor has been President and a

(

i

;:

I

i'
I
!

director of AIA Services. As an officer and direct of AIA Services, John Taylor owes elevated
fiduciary duties to Donna Taylor. John Taylor is a shareholder or part owner of at least one
Idaho entity that has been the recipient of funds, assets and trade secrets which were unlawfully
derived from AIA Services and/or its subsidiaries.
28.

;

I

I

I

From 2007 to the present time, Connie Taylor has been a member of the board of

directors of AJA Services. Connie Taylor is a co-owner of shares in AIA Services with John
Taylor. Connie Taylor is a shareholder or part owner of at least one Idaho entity that has been the
recipient of funds, assets and trade secrets which were unlawfully derived from AJA Services
and/or its subsidiaries.
29.

From 2007 through the present time, Beck has been a member of the board of

directors of AIA Services. Beck was previously on the board of AJA Services for several years
starting in 1995. Beck is or has purported to have been a shareholder of AIA Services from at
least 1995 through 2012. Beck is a shareholder or part owner of at least one Idaho entity that has
been the recipient of funds, assets and trade secrets which were unlawfully derived from AIA
Services.

30.

Cashman was previously on the board of AIA Services for several years starting

in 1995. Cashman is or has purported to have been a shareholder of AIA Services from at least

1995. through 2012. Cashman is a shareholder or part owner of at least one Idaho entity that has
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been the recipient of funds, assets and trade secrets which were unlawfully derived from AIA
Services.
31.

While they were shareholders and/or directors of AIA Services, John Taylor,

Connie Taylor, Beck and Cashman owned interests in other entities that received money, loans,
services, trade secrets and other assets from AIA Services in violation of their fiduciary duties
and in violation of AIA Services' Amended Articles ofinc;orporation and Bylaws.
32.

During times in which Beck, Cashman and/or Connie Taylor were not members

of the board of directors, they were involved with, or aided in, making decisions for AIA
Services and/or acquiesced in decisions made by others, including John Taylor.
33.

From 1995 through the present time, the individual defendants have unlawfully
i

operated AIA Services for their benefit, failed to comply with AIA Services' Restated Bylaws,
failed to comply with AIA Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation, failed to conduct
annual shareholder meetings, failed to provide full disclosure to shareholders and have operated
AIA Service in complete disregard of its corporate structure.
34.

In 1995, the individual defendants desired to redeem Reed Taylor's shares to

obtain control of AIA and bring in a new management team to shift AIA Services' focus to
selling other products. To carry out this new plan, the individual defendants sought to purchase
Reed Taylor's shares in AIA Services through a leveraged stock redemption.
35.

The individual defendants entered into a voting agreement to ensure that they

maintained control over AIA Services.
36.

In a 1995, John Taylor and Connie Taylor (both attorneys licensed to practice law

from 1995 through the present time) became the majority shareholders in AIA Services.
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37.

Since obtaining operational and financial control of AIA Services in 1995, the

individual defendants liave engaged in the following unlawful acts in disregard of AIA Services'
corporate structure, its Amended Articles of Incorporation, Restated Bylaws and }lfoper and
lawful corporate governance: (a) ownership of CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA")
was transferred from AIA Services; (b) AIA Services subsidized CropUSA and other entities; (c)
none of John Taylor's compensation was allocated to CropUSA; (d) there was over $500,000 of
identified expenses paid by AIA Services that were never allocated or billed to CropUSA; (e)
CropUSA was capitalized with over $1.5 Million cash from AIA Services in just one of many
transfers of assets; (f) AIA Services guaranteed a $15 Million loan for CropUSA for no
consideration; (g) CropUSA's sale of $10 Million in assets that were derived from AIA Services;
(h) AIA Services purchased over $400,000 of shares in Pacific Empire Radio Corp. ("PERC")
and then transferred those shares to John Taylor and Connie Taylor; (i) AIA Services transferred
a $95,000 receivable owed by PERC to CropUSA; (k) AIA Services has loaned PERC over
$700,000 in recent years in violation of AIA Services' Articles of Incorporation; (1) AIA
Services has provided labor and services at no cost for other entities owned by the individual
defendants; (m) AIA Services has paid millions of dollars in excessive compensation to John
Taylor ancj. Connie Taylor in exchange for receiving nothing in return; (n) AIA Services was
illegally paying millions of dollars to present and former common shareholders to purchase their
shares and/or make payments on those purchases; (o) John Taylor and Connie Taylor purchased
a parking lot, using AIA's line-of-credit, and promptly increased the $5,000 yearly rent paid by
AIA Services.to $15,000 per year; (p) AJA Services purchased vehicles from John Taylor; (q)
attempt to effectuate a reverse stock split and termination of the ESOP to eliminate those .
shareholders in violation of AIA Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation; and (r) engaged
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in other acts and/or omissions that were illegal, unlawful and/or violated AIA Services' Articles
of Incorporation and Restated Bylaws.
38.

Many of the acts and omissions set forth in the foregoing paragraph occurred

during times in which AIA Services was not current on its obligations to Donna Taylor.
39.

By their own admissions, the individual defendants have operated AIA Services

for their own benefit with complete disregard for AIA Services' corporate structure and the
interests of the Series A Preferred Shareholder.
40.

After taking millions of dollars from AIA Services, the individual defendants now

seek to deprive Donna Taylor of the sums rightfully owed to her. Under the circumstances of this
case, the individual defendants should be liable for all sums owed by AIA Services under the
doctrines of alter-ego and piercing the corporate veil.
41.

However, even if AIA Services and the individual defendants are successful in

reducing the amount owed to Donna Taylor, the individual defendants are liable for ·the
difference based upon their breach of fiduciary duties, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duties and/or unjust enrichment for improperly operating AIA Services to deprive Donna Taylor
of the sums rightfully owed to her. To this day, the individual defendants could have and should
have taken all necessary corporate acts to comply with AIA Services' obligations to Donna
Taylor.
III. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - BREACH OF CONTRACT
(Against AIA Services Only)

42.

I
I
'

Donna Taylor re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support this cause of action.
43.

AIA Services owed Donna Taylor contractual obligations under the Series A

Preferred Shareholder Agreement and/or the previously executed Agreements (including the
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January 11, 1995 Agreement) and/or AIA Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation to
purchase and/or redeem Donna Taylor Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services and make
certain payments to her and other obligations. AIA Services has breached its contractual
obligations owed to Donna Taylor, including, without limitation, the obligations to timely pay
i

her and to purchase and/or redeem her shares.
44.

AIA Services, Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor were and are

required to comply with AIA Services' Amended Articles of Incorporation and owe Donna
Taylor contractual obligations to comply with the Amended Articles of Incorporation; and they
have breached those contractual obligations by, among other things, loaning money to other
parties, attempting to or taking corporate action in violation of AIA Services' in violation of
those Articles and failing to appoint Donna Taylor's. designee to the Board of AIA Services.
45.

As a direct and/or proximate result of foregoing breaches, Donna Taylor has been

damaged, and, is therefore entitled to judgment and/or relief on this claim in an amount to be
proven at or before trial. Donna Taylor also requests specific performance and/or injunctive
relief of AIA Services' obligations.
IV. SECOND OF ACTION - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
(Against Individual Defendants Only).

46.

Donna Taylor re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support this cause of action.
47.

Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and/or Connie Taylor owe and/or owed fiduciary

duties to Donna Taylor, which include, but are not limited to, the duty of loyalty, duty of care
and duty to deal in good faith. Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and/or Connie Taylor have breached
their fiduciary duties owed to Donna Taylor.

COMPLAINT - 11

21

I·

48.

As a direct and/or proximate result of Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and/or Connie

Taylor's acts and/or omissions, Donna Taylor has been damaged, and, is therefore entitled to
judgment and/or relief on this claim in an amount to be proven at or before trial.
V. TIIlRD CAUSE OF ACTION -AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
(Against Individual Defendants Only)

49.

Donna Taylor re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained Ln

other paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support this cause of action.
50.

Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and/or Connie Taylor have intentionally aided,

assisted, covered up, and encouraged the individual defendants and/or other parties in breading
their fiduciary duties owed to Donna Taylor. Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and/or Connie

I.

! -

Taylor's acts and/or omissions constitute aiding and abetting in the breach of fiduciary duties of
other parties, including the individual defendants.
51.

As a direct and/or proximate result of Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and/or Connie

Taylor's acts and/or omissions, Donna Taylor has been damaged, and, is therefore entitled to
judgment and/or relief on this claim in an amount to be proven at or before trial.
VI. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - UNJUST ENRICHMENT
(Against Individual Defendants Only)

52.

Donna Taylor re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support this cause of action.
53.

Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor have been conferred the benefit

by Donna Taylor of obtaining operational and financial control over AIA Services. Through that

..
I.

conferred benefit, Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor have looted AIA Services to

I

their benefit and to the detriment of Donna Taylor. It would be unjust to allow Beck, Cashman,
John Taylor and Connie Taylor to retain the benefits without justly compensating Donna Taylor.
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As a result, Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor liable to Donna Taylor under the
theory ofunjust enrichment.
54.

As a direct and/or proximate result of the acts and/or omissions of Beck,

Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor, they have been unjustly enriched and Donna Taylor
has been damaged, and, is therefore entitled to judgment and/or relief on this claim in an amount
to be proven at or before trial.

VII.FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION -DECLARATORY RELIEF/SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE
55.

Donna Taylor re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in

other paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support this cause of action.

56.

Donna Taylor requests a declaratory judgment and/or specific performance

against the defendants, to the extent necessary, to grant her the relief requested in this Complaint
(including, without limitation, a declaratory judgment ordering the defendants to comply with
AIA Services' Bylaws, Amended Articles of Incorporation (and to rescind/revoke/void
unlawfully filed Amendments thereto and any stock purchases made in violation of the Amended
Articles of Incorporation), contractual obligations, and to compel the purchase of Donna Taylor's
remaining Series A Preferred Shares) and/or such relief as may be requested at or before trial.

VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Donna Taylor prays for the following relief:

1.

For a judgment against AIA Services for all sums owed to Donna Taylor in an

amount to be proven at or before trial, plus prejudgment and post judgment interest;

I

I

2.

For a judgment against John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Beck and Cashman, jointly

and severally, in an amount to be proven at or before trial, plus prejudgment and post judgment
interest;
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3.

I

For judgment against AIA Services compelling it to purchase and/or redeem

!

Donna Taylor's remaining Series A Preferred Shares;
4.

For judgment against the individual defendants compelling them to purchase

and/or redeem Donna Taylor's remaining Series A Preferred Shares;

5.

For a judgment finding that John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Beck and Cashman are

the alter-egos of AIA Services, its subsidiaries and/or that their corporate veil should be pierced
requiring John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Beck and Cashman to be personally liable for all sums

!

and damages owed by AIA Services to Donna Taylor and for judgment to be entered against
them in the amount to be proven at or before trial, plus prejudgment and post judgment interest;
6.

For a judgment barring AIA Services, Beck, Cashman, John Taylor and Connie

Taylor from effectuating a reverse stock split, voiding the termination of the ESOP and voiding
the Amending Articles oflncorporation filed on July 17, 2013;
7.

For a judgment of any other declaratory relief requested and/or contemplated by

the allegations in this Complaint and/or otherwise sought or requested at or before trial based
upon the facts and circumstances of this case;
8.

For a preliminary and permanent injunction against AIA Services, Beck,

Cashman, John Taylor and Connie Taylor barring them from effectuating a reverse stock split
until this lawsuit has concluded and all sums owed to Donna Taylor for her Series A Preferred
Shares have been paid in full;
9.

For a preliminary and permanent injunction seeking any temporary relief

requested by Donna Taylor based upon the facts and circumstances of this case;

10.

For an award of prejudgment interest based upon the statutory rate of 12% ·

because the Agreements requiring the purchase of Donna Taylor's shares do not specify an
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interest rate after the obligations matured;
11.

For an award of compound interest because sums have been intentionally,

vexatiously and maliciously withheld from Donna Taylor;
12.

For an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho

Law, including, without limitation, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121; and
13.

For such other relief that Donna Taylor may request at or before trial and/or such

relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
DATED this 24th day of May, 2013.
OFFICE, PLLC

IX. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Donna J. Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve (12) on all claims and
damages so triable.
DATED this 24th day of May, 2013.
FFICE,PLLC
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Pavmets to Reed and Donna
ComparecUo OJ)erating ln<:ome

9130/2008

(

1995

I

\

AIA Insurance
Net Income

Un-Consoild.ated
AIA Service~
Net Income

(1,;,00,419)

{724,080)

Cash Payments
iotal Income

Other Pa~men~
to Reed

to Reed

757,591

(258,836)

90S,1;!80
958,094

172,520
221,948
275.932

47,850

30t148
"245.999

301.148

120,000

(3~.043}
(447,578)
{483,045)

277,426
61.066

:l6,138

245,999
277,426
117,204,

120.ocio
120,0QO
55,000

(2,902,016}

6,592,648

3,116,718

9,708,367

2,504,439

12,213,805

A

498,,755

E
F
G
199B

1999
.2000

2001
2002
2003
2004

2005

2006
2007
200a

~

A
B

C
D
E
F
G.

H

(359,739)
{910,219)
(793,738)
(531,963)

4,607,657

{7,609,Gn)

(593,414)

1354,658)
(411,941.)
(469,475)
{390,380)
(534.4751
(519,459)
(657:296)

469,115
(32,901)
(798,799)
(216,:308)
(238,684)
96,575
336,071
594,045
(150,720)

i.321.006
469,996
240,000

590,060
D

828Jl54
877;318
(5,061)
313,655
354,730
451,233
750,012
1,063-,!$20
239,660
230.432
71,881
174,251

Payments
to Donna

905,680
958,094
918,766
707,692
353,052
172,520
221,948
275.932

583,065

C

1997

io Re,ecf

Grand Total
2,255,960
46!l,J;l96
240,000
910,979
140,000
9li,06~
3'09.,083
1$.963
488,473
1,199,341
1,252,079
1,206,592
1,003,512
410,729
220,37.0
261).948
365,932
421,148
365,999397,426
172,204

(2,224,499)

B
G

1995

Tola!

*Amount
value of a,rplanes (~greed value per msurance policy)
write off.ot personatAR
·salary
legal bills. Caimcross & Hempeimann
write off CAP BUt
payment of Fells Field Airplane bill
cost of protected agents 9/30/08
Misc. expenses: personal" expenses. peterson consulting, and retainer

140,000
96,065
309,083
15,963
48.8,473

*

1,904.065
469,996
240.000
590,060
140,00Q
96,065
309,083
15.$163

320,919

4S8.473

s1a-.tsa
7.07.692

35~.062

H

351,894

293,467
29'3,985
289.826
295,820
57,677
4a,oo·o
90,000

of assumed liability is $672,339.85
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